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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …agreement with the Air Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in…
  • p. 147 …turned to the Navy, which granted permission for Detachment C to use the Naval Air Station…
  • p. 180 …The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted that any had been deployed, because none could be…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais- sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to illustrate his…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air- craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional buildings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the J58 might be used in future Navy…
Seratov Engels Airfield,
6 December 1959
Licklider. "Missile Gap Controversy.- pp. 608-609.
**13'ec.14.1.
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
OFORN
Chapter 4
165
Staff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of
deployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on
evidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to
the Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning:4
As a result of these Senate hearings, Dulles was determined to
obtain permission for more overflights in order to settle the mis-
sile-gap question once and for all and end the debate within the intelli-
gence community. To accomplish this, Dulles proposed photographing
the most likely areas for the deployment of Soviet missiles. At this
time there was still no evidence of SS-6 ICBM deployment outside the
Tyuratam missile test range. Because the SS-6 was extremely large
and liquid fueled, analysts believed these missiles could only be de-
ployed near railroads. Existing U-2 photography showed railroad
tracks going right to the launching pad at the test site. Dulles, there-
fore argued that SS-6 installations could easily be located by flying
along railroad lines. Dulles was supported by members of the
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.