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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the . Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon officials that…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954. six days before the Wright Air Development…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …1-le then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
Seratov Engels Airfield,
6 December 1959
Licklider. "Missile Gap Controversy.- pp. 608-609.
**13'ec.14.1.
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
OFORN
Chapter 4
165
Staff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of
deployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on
evidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to
the Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning:4
As a result of these Senate hearings, Dulles was determined to
obtain permission for more overflights in order to settle the mis-
sile-gap question once and for all and end the debate within the intelli-
gence community. To accomplish this, Dulles proposed photographing
the most likely areas for the deployment of Soviet missiles. At this
time there was still no evidence of SS-6 ICBM deployment outside the
Tyuratam missile test range. Because the SS-6 was extremely large
and liquid fueled, analysts believed these missiles could only be de-
ployed near railroads. Existing U-2 photography showed railroad
tracks going right to the launching pad at the test site. Dulles, there-
fore argued that SS-6 installations could easily be located by flying
along railroad lines. Dulles was supported by members of the
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.