Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft 8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA 13 Scientists…
  • p. 6 …260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design 270 Efforts To…
  • p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (1983). E0129581.131d111>10<25Yrs…
  • p. 21 …August 1953, OS1 records (S). " Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2, Aerograph 3 (Austin, Texas: Aerofax, 1983…
  • p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
  • p. 23 …high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Chapter 1 10 Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the…
  • p. 24 …Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 12. For more details on Kelly Johnson's original proposal. see…
  • p. 25 12 The Lockheed CL-282 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 1 Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay…
  • p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
  • p. 27 …six days before the Wright Air Development Command began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described…
  • p. 28 …range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL…
  • p. 29 …Few details about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but…
  • p. 30 …At this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support…
  • p. 37 …ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design…
  • p. 39 …Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954…
  • p. 40 …Council.46 Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 Even before the final Technological Capabilities…
  • p. 42 …Agency.49 Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft soon after he…
  • p. 43 …Chapter 1 30 briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the 24…
  • p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
  • p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of…
  • p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar- gued that the Bell…
  • p. 49 …He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which…
  • p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais- sance…
  • p. 52 …afternoon of 3 December, they Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U…
  • p. 53 …Eventually Bissell asked who was going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed…
  • p. 55 …This category in- cluded maintenance personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and support personnel…
  • p. 57 …Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename…
  • p. 58 …The U-2 would have a The Lockheed "Skunk Works" was named after the Kickapoo Joy…
  • p. 59 …Johnson, -A High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft, - 9 December 1954, Lockheed Contract Files, OSA Records (S). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 61 …Reconnaissance Aircraft, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Report 10420. 28 January 1955. pp. 7-9, OSA Recordsi \ (5…
  • p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would…
  • p. 69 …Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20. Sè'biet UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 74 …aircraft—remained the ex- clusive province of Lockheed:9 As a result of this agreement, CIA…
  • p. 77 …The first model of the pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
  • p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
  • p. 81 …former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works, to Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller…
  • p. 84 …7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22. OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 12-14…
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity. The…
  • p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAL pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed…
  • p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
  • p. 107 …U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF…
  • p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test…
  • p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot Robert Sicker bailed out but was struck…
  • p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots, as well as the pro- totype…
  • p. 157 …As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this…
  • p. 162 …a series of tests over Edwards AFB. Lockheed began coating the 11-2s with a standard…
  • p. 188 …Although it haL refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that would…
  • p. 200 …Beschloss claims that Powers was fired by Lockheed for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which…
  • p. 209 …Some poetic justice in this.' One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up…
  • p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that they could be refueled in…
  • p. 220 …story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico…
  • p. 230 …CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 5 Late in 1958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U…
  • p. 264 …1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for ei g ht more aircraft to be…
  • p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft…
  • p. 266 …began coming off the production line at Lockheed in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the…
  • p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
  • p. 275 …Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 280 …During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair worked to reduce the radar cross…
  • p. 281 …In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched aircraft known as the A…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Sec FORN
Chapter 1
4
The Soviet Union's air defense policy became even more aggres-
sive in August 1952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating
Japanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home
island. Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft
stalked and shot down a US RB-29 flying over Hokkaido. Aerial re-
connaissance of the Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become
a very dangerous business.
Despite the growing risks associated with aerial reconnaissance
of the Soviet Bloc, senior US officials strongly believed that such
missions were necessary. The lack of information about the Soviet
Union, coupled with the perception that it was an aggressive nation
determined to expand its borders—a perception that had been greatly
strengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South
Korea in June 1950—increased US determination to obtain informa-
tion about Soviet intentions and capabilities and thus reduce the dan-
ger of being surprised by a Soviet attack.
New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance
While existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky re-
connaissance missions over the Soviet Union, the United States began
planning for a more systematic and less dangerous approach using
new technology. One of the leading advocates of the need for new,
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard S. Leghorn, a
Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate and employee of
Eastman Kodak who had commanded the Army Air Forces' 67th
Reconnaissance Group in Europe during World War II. After the war
he returned to Kodak but maintained his interest in photoreconnais-
sance. Leghorn strongly believed in the need for what he called
pre-D-day reconnaissance, that is, reconnaissance of a potential
enemy before the outbreak of actual hostilities, in contrast to combat
reconnaissance in wartime. In papers presented in 1946 and 1948,
Leghorn argued that the United States needed to develop such a capa-
bility, which would require high-altitude aircraft and high-resolution
cameras. The outbreak of the Korean war gave Leghorn an opportu-
nity to put his ideas into effect. Recalled to active duty by the Air
Force, Lieutenant Colonel Leghorn became the head of the
Reconnaissance Systems Branch of the Wright Air Development
Command at Dayton, Ohio, in April 1951.5
Richard S. Leghorn, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Washington.
DC. 19 August 1985 (S).
—.3•Gzea.
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.