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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Secret
Chapter 3
153
Abdel Nasser overthrew the Government of Iraq and assassinated the
royal family. Long concerned by the growing influence of Nasser,
who had close ties to the Soviet Union and now headed both Egypt
and Syria in the new United Arab Republic, President Eisenhower de-
cided that US intervention was necessary to stabilize the situation in
Lebanon and to show Nasser that the United States was willin g to use
force to defend its vital interests in the region. Before intervening in
Lebanon, the United States consulted with the United Kingdom,
which also decided to intervene in the Middle East by sending para-
troopers to assist the Government of Jordan on 17 July.
With US Marines and Army troops deployed in a potentially
hostile situation in Lebanon. US military commanders and intelli-
gence community analysts immediately requested tactical reconnais-
sance flights to look for threats to the US units and evidence that
other Middle Eastern countries or the Soviet Union might be prepar-
ing to intervene. The U-2s of Detachment B in Turkey carried out
these missions.
Because tactical reconnaissance required an immediate readout
of _the films taken, the Photographic Intelligence Center (the new
name for the Photo-Intelli gence Division from August 1958) quickly
reopened the film-developing unit at Adana and staffed it with lab
technicians and photointerpreters. Throughout the summer of 1958.
Detachment B U-2s brought back photography of military camps, air-
fields, and ports of those Mediterranean countries receiving Soviet
arms. The detachment also kept a close watch on Egyptian-based
Soviet submarines, which posed a threat to US 6th Fleet ships in the
Mediterranean. In addition, U-2s flew occasional electronic intelli-
gence collection missions along the Soviet border and over the Black
Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as the crisis in
the Middle East eased, the United States began withdrawing its
14,300 troops. It was not until 25 October, however, that the last
American soldier left Lebanon.'7
Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. pp. 462-473.
Ell 12958 1.6(dilll>1010.425Yrs
ISI
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.