Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“Sea”17 pages
.17 ertre4e1Q 01\1 Chapter 3 149 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED speed, apply full throttle to the engine, then pull back on the stick and zoom as high as he could. In this manner the Soviet pilot hoped to come up directly beneath the U-2 so he could use his guns and mis- siles against the shiny U-2 etched in silver against the dark blue-black of space. Using this maneuver, some MiGs were able to climb as high as the U-2 but seldom got very close. At this height the MiGs were completely out of control; their small, swept-back wings provided in- sufficient lift; and their control surfaces were too small to maintain aircraft stability. U-2 pilots often spotted MiGs that reached the apex of their zoom climbs and then fell away toward the earth. The US pi- lots' greatest fear was that one of the MiGs would actually collide with a U-2 during a zoom climb.I°4 U-2 pilots complained that they felt like ducks in a shooting gal- lery under these circumstances and suggested that the underside of the silvery aircraft be camouflaged in some manner. Kelly Johnson had originally believed the U-2 would Hy so high that it would be invisi- ble, thus eliminating the need to paint the aircraft and thereby avoid- ing the added weight and drag that paint produced. The paint penalty was calculated to be a foot of altitude for every pound of paint. A full coat of paint cost the U-2 250 feet of altitude, substantially less than the 1,500-foot penalty paid for the addition of dirty bird devices. By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests over Edwards AFB. Lockheed began coating the 11-2s with a standard blue-black military specificatioi oa . nt on to and a lighter cloud-blue paint below. Subsequent tests revealed that the U-2s were less conspicuous when painted all over with a matte-finish blue-black color, which helped them blend with the dark canopy of space.'* MORE POWERFUL ENGINES FOR THE U-2 Less conspicuous paints were not the only answer to the growing threat of Soviet interceptors. A more powerful engine would increase the U-2's maximum altitude, which was the surest way to protect the aircraft from all Soviet threats. During late 1958 and early 1959. Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U-2s- originally the Agency had taken delivery of 20 planes and the Air Information supplied by to Donald E. Welzenbach, May 1986. Lockheed contracts, OSA records (S). EO 129581.6fillill>1010<25Yrs 'Si UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.