Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
148
shoot down a U-2. Before the program started, Richard Bissell had
estimated that the U-2 would be able to fly over the Soviet Union
with impunity for only about two years. This period was already over,
and the Soviets were working frantically to devise a means to stop
U-2 overflights. From the very beginning, Soviet air defense units had
not only tracked U-2s with radars, but had also made repeated efforts
to shoot them down with antiaircraft weapons and interceptor aircraft.
In 1956 such attempted interceptions had involved primarily MiG-15s
and MiG-17s, which could barely reach 55,000 feet. The advent of
MiG-19s and MiG-21s, which could climb even higher, provided a
greater threat for U-2 pilots.
Realistic training for pilots learning to intercept the U-2 became
possible after the Soviets developed a new high-altitude aircraft, the
Mandrake, which was actually an improved version of the
Yakovlev-25 all-weather interceptor. The Mandrake used a high-lift,
low-drag wing design similar to that employed by the U-2, but its
twin engines made it heavier. The Mandrake's operating altitude was
55,000 to 65,000 feet, and its maximum altitude was 69,000, far less
than the 75,000 feet reached by the U-2. Like the U-2, the
Mandrake's wings would not tolerate great stresses, so it could not be
used as an attack aircraft at the high altitudes at which both planes
operated. Between 1957 and 1959, Yakovlev built 15 to 20 of these
aircraft in two versions: the Mandrake-R or YAK-25RM and the
Mandrake-T, sometimes called the YAK-26. These high-altitude air-
craft were used to overfly the Middle East, India, China, and
Pakistan, as well as border regions of NATO nations in Europe during
the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is not believed that Mandrakes ever
attempted to overfly the continental United States."'
Beginning in late 1957, the Mandrake served as a practice target
for pilots of high-performance Soviet MiG-I9 and MiG-2 I intercep-
tors. The Soviet technique that most concerned U-2 pilots was the
"snap up" or power dive and zoom climb. In this maneuver,
ground-based radar operators would direct the interceptor aircraft
along the same flight path as the U-2. When the MiG pilot achieved
the same compass heading as the U-2 flying more than 10,000 feet
above him, he would put his aircraft into a shallow dive to pick up
'*%%.gt■cq4....
"Yakovlev Yak-25RM Mandrake, — Jane's Defence Weekly. vol. 3. no. 7, 16 February
1985.
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.