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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 24 …Advanced Development Projects Division, Burbank. California. ED 129581.131011>10<25Yrs IS1 UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 58 …Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988. Sbc.et UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity. The…
  • p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
  • p. 287 …designed trailer truck that carried it from Burbank By 18 November 1959, the mockup was in…
  • p. 297 …Construction began in September 1960; a C-47 shuttle service ferried work crews from Burbank to…
  • p. 299 …The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at two days later. After the…
  • p. 304 …into the engine nacelles during assembly at Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial…
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Chapter 1
2
By 1949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe had
been effectively curtained off from the outside world, and the Soviet
military carried out its planning, production, and deployment activi-
ties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities—
bomber forces, ballistic missiles, submarine forces, and nuclear weap-
ons plants—were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air
defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory
policies, was also largely an unknown factor.
Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders severely curtailed
the movement of human intelligence sources. In addition, the Soviet
Union made its conventional means of communication—telephone,
telegraph, and radio-telephone—more secure, thereby greatly reduc-
ing the intelligence available from these sources. The stringent secu-
rity measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively
blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents
using covert means to communicate intelligence, travelers to and
from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and re-
port their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping meth-
ods, and postal intercepts. Indeed, the entire panoply of intelligence
tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other
methods were available.
Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance
Although at the end of World War lithe United States had captured
large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet
Union, this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source
of current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was
interrogation of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To
obtain information about Soviet scientific progress, the intelligence
community established several programs to debrief German scientists
who had been taken to the Soviet Union after the end of the war but
were now being allowed to leave.'
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.