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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
-005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Mission folder 4019 (22 December 1956), OSA records.
Codewor(1).
ITS
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Chapter 3
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ED 129581.61O1l>11425Yrs
[SI
Although the U-2 overflights of Eastern Europe in late 1956
caused renewed Soviet protests, the sharpest protest came on 15
December 1956, after three specially modified USAF RB-57D bomb-
ers photographed the city of Vladivostok in a high-speed dash over
the Far Eastern coast of the Soviet Union (as part of the Air Force's
Operation BLACK KNIGHT). President Eisenhower had approved
the mission after being told by the Air Force that the high-speed
RB-57Ds would probably not be detected.66
Reacting strongly to the Soviet protest, the President told
Secretary of State Dulles on 18 December that he was going to "order
complete stoppage of this entire business." As for a reply to the
Soviet protest, Dulles said, "I think we will have to admit this was
done and say we are sorry. We cannot deny it." Dulles noted that
"our relations with Russia are pretty tense at the moment."
Eisenhower agreed, noting that this was no time to be provocative. He
then instructed Colonel Goodpaster to call Secretary of Defense
Wilson, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Radford, and DCI Dulles to
order: "Effective immediately, there are to be no flights by US recon-
naissance aircraft over Iron Curtain countries." 67
Flights along the borders of Iron Curtain countries continued,
however, and, on 22 December 1956, Detachment B flew the first
mission (4019) by a U-2 equipped for electronic intercept. The elec-
tronic-detection equipment known as the System-V unit (see appendix
C) was installed in the bay normally used by the main camera, and the
plane flew along the Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian
Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System-V unit worked well.64
Early in 1957, a mission along the Soviet border accidentally
turned into an overflight. On 18 March 1957, a U-2 collecting elec-
tronic intelligence along the Soviet southern border entered Soviet
Goodpaster interview (S).
Telephone calls 18 December 1956. DDE Diary. DDEL. (U); Andrew J. Goodpaster.
Memorandum for the Record. 18 December 1956. WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS, down-
graded to S); the Soviet protest note of 15 December 1956 and the U.S. reply of 11
January 1957 are contained in "Alleged Overflight of Soviet Area by American Planes."
US Department of State Bulletin, vol. 36. 28 January 1957. p. 135. Although Dulles's ini-
tial inclination had been to offer an apology, the U.S. reply stated that the "only autho-
rized United States Air Force flights in the general area of the Sea of Japan were normal
training activities."
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.