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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Secre N
Chapter 3
125
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
warnings to all pilots about the danger of opening the helmet face-
plate at high altitudes, several pilots were known to do so. Some ate
candy bars; favored lemon drops. On the morning of 10
December, was undergoing prebreathing, the Air Force en-
listed man who oversaw lis preflight regimen placed an L-pill in the
righthand knee pocket of ight suit, unaware that this pocket
also contained supply of lemon drops. After he took off,
began indulging in his habit of sucking lemon drops. About mi
into the mission, he opened his faceplate and popped into his mouth
what he thought was another lemon drop. After closing the faceplate,
he began sucking on the object and thought it strange that it had no
flavor and was much smoother than the previous lemon drops.
Although tempted to bite down, pidecided instead to reopen his
faceplate and see what it was he had in his mouth. Spitting the object
into his hand, he saw that he had been sucking on the L-pill with its
lethal contents of potassium cyanide. Just a thin layer of glass had
stood between him and death. The loss of his aircraft over Bulgaria
would have exposed the U-2 program to worldwide publicity and
would probably have resulted in an early end to overflights.'
__ Detachment A's security officer overheard relating the
L-pill story to a fellow pilot several days later and prom tly reported
the conversation to headquarters. When details of close call
reached Washington, James Cunningham immediately or ered L-pills
placed in boxes so that there would be no chance of mistaking them
for anything else. The L-pill continued to be available for another
three years. Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B,
raised an important question that had never
been considered: what would happen if an L-pill with its volatile con-
tents accidentally broke inside the cockpit of a U-2? Realizing that
such an accident would result in the death of the pilot, James
Cunningham ordered the destruction of all L-pills and then turned to
for a better idea. By this time
the state of the art in lethal devices was a needle poisoned with algal,
an extremely deadly shellfish toxin. The needle was hidden in a tiny
hole in a silver dollar supplied by Cunningham. Only one poison-nee-
dle coin was made because Cunningham decided that, if any pilot had
to use it because of capture, there would probably not be any more
overflights."
(0 12958 1.8(dlifi>1010.425Yrs
(012958 1.6181111>1011110<25Yrs
14 January 1960; MICable from Detachment B to Development
cable from o Detachment B. 7 January 960. USA records,
"Operation EDGE" (TS Codeword).
S ret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.