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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 6 …Project OXCART, 1956-1968 The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 260…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 ORN Chapter 1 11 Kelly Johnson %.419r.,‹ 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED gravity (g's) instead of the military…
  • p. 27 …He later advanced to the rank of brigadier general in the reserve. For Strong's contacts…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech- nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy, combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …UNCLASSIFIED """"Igeret-ALQ Chapter 2 63 advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num- ber of…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 250 …so urgent that the Defense Department finally re ente CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Advanced ECM Equipment for Demand…
  • p. 265 …the U-2R needed a camera that incorporated the many im- portant advances that had occurred…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-58B program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 307 …he an- nounced the successful development of an -advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The aban- donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no more advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft—the OXCART—and…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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Chapter 3
112
No one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal
that U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for
this change in the estimates.'
The need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused
problems even within the CIA itself. The Office of Security sharply
restricted the number of persons who could be cleared for access to
U-2 photography. The special clearance was granted on a "slot" ba-
sis, and only the person assigned to a particular position or "slot"
could have the clearance. The U-2 photographs were kept in a secure
room, and only those with special clearances were admitted to the
room. In addition, the Office of Security considered U-2 information
too sensitive to use in CIA publications. As a result, many analysts
did not have access to information that would have greatly aided the
production of intelligence estimates.42
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS
Although U-2s had ceased flying over the Soviet Bloc because of
President Eisenhower's standdown order, they could still be used
elsewhere in the world. The Middle East would be the next area for
U-2 operations. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in retaliation for the de-
cision by the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw fi-
nancial support for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser's action provoked
an international crisis that would have a permanent effect on the U-2
program.
Long before the Suez Crisis developed, the CIA had planned to
deploy U-2s in Turkey for use in the Soviet overflight program. On I
May 1956, US Charge d'Affaires Foy D. Kohler approached Turkish
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on this matter. He told the Prime
Minister that the effort was a continuation of the GENETR1X pro-
gram, during which balloons had been released from Turkey, and in-
volved aircraft that could fly 10,000 feet higher than any Soviet
plane. Menderes gave his approval immediately. At the time of the
John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military
Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), pp. 45-47.
Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.