Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
S"ZatiThIQE,C),B4.1
Chapter 3
112
No one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal
that U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for
this change in the estimates.'
The need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused
problems even within the CIA itself. The Office of Security sharply
restricted the number of persons who could be cleared for access to
U-2 photography. The special clearance was granted on a "slot" ba-
sis, and only the person assigned to a particular position or "slot"
could have the clearance. The U-2 photographs were kept in a secure
room, and only those with special clearances were admitted to the
room. In addition, the Office of Security considered U-2 information
too sensitive to use in CIA publications. As a result, many analysts
did not have access to information that would have greatly aided the
production of intelligence estimates.42
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS
Although U-2s had ceased flying over the Soviet Bloc because of
President Eisenhower's standdown order, they could still be used
elsewhere in the world. The Middle East would be the next area for
U-2 operations. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in retaliation for the de-
cision by the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw fi-
nancial support for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser's action provoked
an international crisis that would have a permanent effect on the U-2
program.
Long before the Suez Crisis developed, the CIA had planned to
deploy U-2s in Turkey for use in the Soviet overflight program. On I
May 1956, US Charge d'Affaires Foy D. Kohler approached Turkish
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on this matter. He told the Prime
Minister that the effort was a continuation of the GENETR1X pro-
gram, during which balloons had been released from Turkey, and in-
volved aircraft that could fly 10,000 feet higher than any Soviet
plane. Menderes gave his approval immediately. At the time of the
John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military
Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), pp. 45-47.
Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.