Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“Nevers”24 pages
• Records of Codeword). OSA records (TS • NPIC History, vol. 1, p 23 (S) CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 3 111 radar-absorbing materials and techniques proposed by Purcell. The ef- fort, known as Project RAINBOW, got under way by the end of the 39 year. THE END OF THE BOMBER GAP During the three-week period of 20 June to 10 July 1956, U-2s had made eight overflights beyond the Iron Curtain, including five over the Soviet Union. PID's photointerpreters were busy until the end of August with their initial evaluation of the photography obtained by these flights. Their efforts were complicated by the division's move on 9 July from Que Building to the Steuart Building, but, when the photointerpreters were finished, they were able to write "finis" to the controversy over Soviet bomber strength. Although the Air Force had claimed that the Soviet Union pos- sessed almost 100 of the new Myasishchev-4 (Bison) heavy bombers, U-2 photography proved this assertion wrong. There were no Bison bombers at any of the nine long-range bomber bases photographed by the July missions. DCI Allen Dulles was particularly impressed by the photographs of the Soviet bomber bases, which in later years he called "million-dollar" photography. The actual value of the U-2 photos was probably even greater because, on the strength of their ev- idence, the White House was able to deny Air Force requests for ad- ditional B-52 bombers to "catch up" to the Soviets.j° Because of the need to protect the source of the information about Soviet bomber strength, the controversy surrounding this issue did not immediately die down. In November 1956, when the CIA began providing new Bison production figures based on U-2 photog- raphy without identifying the source, some members of Congress— unaware of the existence of the U-2—questioned the motivation be- hind the reduced estimates. They suggested that either the earlier es- timates of Soviet bomber strength had been inflated to increase Air Force appropriations or the new estimates had been reduced by White House direction in order to hold down military expenditures. ED 129581.6[dilll>10<25Yrs tsI S et UNCLASSIFIED
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.