Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 134 …By the end of the month, foreign troops began evacuating Egyptian terri- tory, and the pressure…
-005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
--;771.e 11K94Q$14.1
Chapter 3
104
E0129581.61011>10<25Yrs
Is)
detachment had four aircraft working and could average up to two
flights per day, Bissell told the President that the crews were "ready
and eager to go in beyond the satellites" and overfly the center of the
Soviet Union.'"
Eisenhower replied that he thought it "urgent" to know whether
the recent flights had been tracked by hostile radars. The President
was obviously concerned that CIA estimates that the U-2 could fly
virtually undetected were proving false. One of the reasons why he
had approved the overflight program was the CIA's assurance that the
Soviet Union would remain unaware of the flights or—at the very
worst—receive only occasional, vague indications.
FIRST U-2 FLIGHTS OVER THE SOVIET UNION
The question of how well the Soviets could track U-2 flights had not
yet been settled when the first overflights of the Soviet Union took
place. On Wednesday, 4 July 1956, the U-2 known as Article 347 be-
gan the first flight over the Soviet Union. Final authorization for mis-
sion 2013 had come shortly before takeoff. Late on the evening of 3
July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building to
give the "Go" or "No go" decision. Although the President had ap-
proved the overflight, the final decision to start a mission depended
on a number of factors, especially the weather over the target area and
at the takeoff and landing sites. Bissell made the decision just before
midnight Washington time, which was six o'clock in the morning in
Wiesbaden. This pattern of last-minute approvals continued for the
duration of the U-2 overflight program.'4
When Wiesbaden received the "Go" signal, a U-2 equipped with
an A-2 camera and flown by pilot took off on a
course that took it over Poznan Poland, where riots had occurred on
28-30 June. After Poznan eaded for Belorussia, where he
turned north to Leningrad. The last leg of the mission took the U-2
over the Soviet Baltic states before returning to Wiesbaden. The main
target of this mission was the naval shipyards in Leningrad, center of
Andrew J. Goodpaster's handwritten notes on 2 July 1956 meeting. WHOSS. Alpha.
DDEL (TS).
Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Cunningham interview (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.