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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
Chapter 3
97
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Even though President Eisenhower had approved every stage of
the U-2's development, knowing full well that the aircraft was being
built to fly over the Soviet Union, the actual decision to authorize
such flights was very difficult for him. He remained concerned that
overflights could poison relations with the Soviet Union and might
even lead to hostilities. One argument that helped overcome the
President's reluctance was the CIA's longstanding contention that U-2
flights might actually go undetected because Soviet radars would not
be able to track aircraft at such high altitudes. This belief was based
on a 1952 study of Soviet World War II–vintage radars and on 1955
tests using US radars, which—unknown to US officials—were not as
effective as Soviet radars against high-altitude targets. Shortly before
U-2 operations began, however, the CIA's Office of Scientific
Intelligence (OSI) conducted a vulnerability study of the U-2 that was
published on 28 May 1956. The study's conclusion was that "Maxi-
mum Soviet radar detection ranges against the Project aircraft at ele-
vation in excess of 55,000 feet would vary from 20 to 150 miles....
In our opinion, detection can therefore be assumed." The OSI study
added, however, "It is doubtful that the Soviets can achieve consis-
tent tracking of the Project vehicle." 9 Completed just three weeks be-
fore the initation of overflights, this study seems to have had little
impact on the thinking of the top project officials. They continued to
believe that the Soviets would not be able to track the U-2 and might
even fail to detect it, except for possible vague indications."'
Soviet radars were not President Eisenhower's only concern.
Also fearing that a malfunction might cause a U-2 to crash inside the
Soviet Union, he asked Allen Dulles what the consequences would
be. The President's staff secretary, Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, who
was present at virtually all White House meetings on the U-2 project
and served as the President's intermediary to the CIA on this issue,
later recalled:
Allen's approach was that we were unlikely to lose one. If we did
lose one, the pilot would not survive.... We were told—and it
was part of our understanding of the situation—that it was al-
most certain that the plane would disintegrate and that we could
" OSA History, chap. 11, p. 31 (TS Codeword). For the belief that the U-2 might go unde-
tected see the Leghorn interview and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Waging Peace, 1956-1961
(New York, 1965), P. 41.
Richard M. Bissell, Jr., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow, tape recording, Farmington,
Connecticut, 28 October 1988 (S).
et
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.