Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
.N.Nlbtoc‹.%%,
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 2
88
E0129581.6(d1111>10<25Yrs
IS]
These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh
the political liabilities of the international protests. CIA officials be-
came concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overfli g hts could
sour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights, including those
by the U-2, which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore.
DDCI CabeII wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February
1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the "additional
political pressures being generated against all balloon operations and
overflights, thus increasing the difficulties of policy decisions which
would permit such operations in the future." 7'
In addition to its concern for the future of the U-2 program, the
A gency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon over-
flights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the
Free Europe Committee—a covert Agency operation based in West
Germany—used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern
Europe.
AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Although knowledge of the U-2 project was a closely g uarded se-
cret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration,
DCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be
told about the project. On 24 February 1956, Dulles met with
Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell, the ranking
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcom-
mittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project
AQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some mem-
bers of the House of Representatives should also be informed. As a
result of the senators' recommendation that the senior members of
the House Appropriations Committee should be briefed, Dulles later
met with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and
Clarence Cannon. Official Congressional knowledge of the U-2 pro-
ject remained confined to this small group for the next four years.
The House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcommittee
did not receive a CIA briefin g on the U-2 project until after the loss
of Francis Gary . Powers's U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960.'4
" Philip G. Strong, Attachment to Memorandum for DC1 Dulics. "Project GENETRIX
Summary." 15 February 1956, OSI records (S).
" John S. Warner. Legislative Counsel. Memorandum for the Record. — A UATONE
Briefings," IS November 1957, Office of Congressional Affairs records.
SI; Warner interview (SI.
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.