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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
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CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 2
88
E0129581.6(d1111>10<25Yrs
IS]
These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh
the political liabilities of the international protests. CIA officials be-
came concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overfli g hts could
sour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights, including those
by the U-2, which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore.
DDCI CabeII wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February
1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the "additional
political pressures being generated against all balloon operations and
overflights, thus increasing the difficulties of policy decisions which
would permit such operations in the future." 7'
In addition to its concern for the future of the U-2 program, the
A gency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon over-
flights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the
Free Europe Committee—a covert Agency operation based in West
Germany—used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern
Europe.
AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Although knowledge of the U-2 project was a closely g uarded se-
cret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration,
DCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be
told about the project. On 24 February 1956, Dulles met with
Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell, the ranking
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcom-
mittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project
AQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some mem-
bers of the House of Representatives should also be informed. As a
result of the senators' recommendation that the senior members of
the House Appropriations Committee should be briefed, Dulles later
met with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and
Clarence Cannon. Official Congressional knowledge of the U-2 pro-
ject remained confined to this small group for the next four years.
The House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcommittee
did not receive a CIA briefin g on the U-2 project until after the loss
of Francis Gary . Powers's U-2 over the Soviet Union in May 1960.'4
" Philip G. Strong, Attachment to Memorandum for DC1 Dulics. "Project GENETRIX
Summary." 15 February 1956, OSI records (S).
" John S. Warner. Legislative Counsel. Memorandum for the Record. — A UATONE
Briefings," IS November 1957, Office of Congressional Affairs records.
SI; Warner interview (SI.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.