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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 12 …later, at press conferences in February and July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence…
  • p. 40 …MIT Press. 1977), p. 68: Beschloss, Maplay, p. 74: TCP Report. pp. 185-186 (S). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …The "provisional" designation gave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional Air Force units did…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press, 1982), pp. 45-47. Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 174 …McElroy stressed that the gap would be temporary and that at its end the United States…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress, Senate. Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …MIT Press, 1977. Kistiakowsky. George B. A Scientist at the White House. Cambridge: Harvard University Press…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Secre FORN
Chapter
87
Although the photo intelligence gained from Project GENETRIX
was limited in quantity, it was still some of the best and most com-
plete photography obtained of the Soviet Union since World War II. It
was referred to as "pioneer" photography because it provided a base-
line for all future overhead photography. Even innocuous photos of
such things as forests and streams proved valuable in later years when
U-2 and satellite photography revealed construction activity.
Of still greater importance to the U-2 program, however, was the
data that US and NATO radars obtained as they tracked the paths of
the balloons—whose average altitude was 45,800 feet—over the
Soviet Bloc. This data provided the most accurate record to date of
high-altitude wind currents, knowledge that meteorologists were later
able to put to use to determine optimum flightpaths for U-2 flights.
One completely fortuitous development from Project
GENETRIX had nothing to do with the cameras but involved a steel
bar. This bar served a dual purpose: the rigging of the huge polyethyl-
ene gasbag was secured to the top of the bar and the camera-payload
_arid automatic-ballasting equipment was attached to the bottom. By
sheer chance, the length of the bar-91 centimeters—corresponded to
the wavelength of the radio frequency used by a Soviet radar known
by its NATO designator as TOKEN. This was an S-band radar used
by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled intercept.
The bar on the GENETR1X balloons resonated when struck by
TOKEN radar pulses, making it possible for radar operators at US
and NATO installations on the periphery of the Soviet Union to locate
a number of previously unknown TOKEN radars.
These radar findings, coupled with other intercepts made during
the balloon flights, provided extensive data on Warsaw Pact radar net-
works, radar sets, and ground-controlled interception techniques.
Analysis of these intercepts revealed the altitude capabilities and
tracking accuracy of radars, the methods used by Warsaw Pact nations
to notify each other of the balloons' passage (handing off), and the
altitudes at which Soviet aircraft could intercept the balloons. All of
this information could be directly applied to future U-2 missions.7'
Final Report, Project 119L. 1st Air Division (Meteorological Survey) Strategic Air
Command. 5 March 1956, 0-582, General Summary (TS, declassified 1979).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.