Richard Helms Interviewed by R. Jack Smith, 21 April 1982

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failures.) This is one, this Arab-Israeli thing. Are there any o t h k that occurred during your tenure that
you remember as one even remotely comparable in quality?
N R H : I don’t recall any particular episode that was as clean-cut as the 1967 war was. But there were
certain Estimates, including the one that you just mentioned - the Rolling Thunder Studies - during the
Vietnamese War. I think that the actual fighting of the war in Laos was a great Agency success. The
development of these technical gadgets; they were really outstanding Agency contributions to
intelligence. And anything that you see in the record that looked as though they shone brightly I would
be glad to have included. You know, one of the things that happened to me, Jack, was that as a result of
those investigations in 1975 and being obliged to focus on minor little problems having to do with the
Agency’s past and with a lot of criticism, and all the rest of it, it has tended for some reason to make my
memory almost a hash. In other words, I have a very hard time picking out episodes and putting them in
the right time frame and in the right context. In other words, there is no historical perspective in my
head any more at all. And so I need help on some of these things. And I would be @adto have you as
you examine the record if you tick off two or three things, such as analysis or estimating or some
(U/&Q) JS: Well, I don’t think there was any lack of success, per se. I was just wondering whether
there was any other occasion you remember in which the claim from the White House and McNamara -
clandestine services operation that was unusually helpful, and throwhinto the package. 3 a - 9 - ~ r - ’1 1 1 1 ’ 1‘ *A. , 1 ,
(U) RH:Nothing yet, I don’t recall anything that was quite as dramatic.
(U/- JS: No, of course not. They’d all be second best.
)&J RH:There was an interesting episode for example. I understand that the Pike Committee was critical
in their analysis of what the Agency did regarding the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in August
1968, that the Agency had missed the mark so badly. Well, I just refuse to accept that indictment.
Because I know very well what happened on that particular day in August. Up to that period there were
all kinds of reports about the maneuvers of the Russian Army being conducted in East Germany. And
about the way that they were coming up to the Czechoslovakian border. And the fact that the Prague
Spring and the Dubce thing was bubbling up. I think everybody was concerned with what exactly was
going to happen. What are they going to do and so forth. Well, on this particular day, I don’t remember
what day of the week it was but that’s irrelevant, you can look it up in the document. Dick Lehman
came into my office; say, middle of the mo’ming, or maybe it was 11:OO,maybe it was, that late, he said,
“You know, we’ve got to take a look at something here. Those maneuvers of the Red Army are going in
widening circles, and there isn’t any doubt that at any time they can simply make a slight turn and go
straight into Czechoslovakia. “Now”, he said, “Ontop of that we suddenly got a UP1 report here that
says that the Politburo was meeting in Moscow.” And I said, “My God, who is that UP1 fella; isn’t he
the guy that’s been there forever and so forth?’ He said, “Yes”, and gave me his name, and I’ve
forgotten what it was, Shapiro or something. And I said he usually has his stuff fairly right. And Dick
said, “Yea, that’s why I bring this to you. Because aRer all, now let’s take a look at this thing, all those
guys are supposed to be in Sochi in August. Now what are they doing back in Moscow, having a
meeting like this? And I think that you’d better warn the President that the Russians may be ready to be
coming after the Czechoslovakians.” So I went to lunch that day down there and I reported this to
Johnson, and Johnson said, “Oh, no, they’rejust talking about us. That’s what that means.” And I said,
“NO,Mr. President, they’re coming after you.” What was odd about this meeting was that I was telling
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