Richard Helms Interviewed by R. Jack Smith, 21 April 1982

1
s k ? y / 2 03 00809
Richard Helms (RH)
Interviewed by R. Jack Smith (JS)
21 April 1982
Retyped by P. DeStefano
(U)The attached transcript is a product of the CIA’SOral History Program, conducted under the
auspices of the CIA History Staff. The statements, assertions, and opinions, which compose the text of
the transcript, are those of the interview participants alone. They do not necessarily reflect official
positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or
present. Nothing in the transcript should be construed as necessarily asserting or implying US
Government endorsement or acknowledgementof the factual accuracy of the statements, assertions, or
opinions expressed by the participants in the interview.
( U / w O ) RH:I think, Jack, that I’d like to, since we’d already mentioned this matter, that I’d like to
take up this question that I have down here as number 5, first, the [Nelson] Rockefeller Report. Because
there is a point, in connection with that report that 1wanted to make to you. As Ray Cline points out in
his book on page 262, at least this is the most recent version of the book; he quotes from the Rockefeller
Report. And 1guess he has quoted this accurately, you can certainly verify that with a copy of the report,
but he points out that one of the most pertinent comments in the whole Rockefeller Report
recommended that “careful attention be paid to selecting a person with independent stature for this
crucial post of public service” - being Director of Central Intelligence. They said, and this comes from
the Rockefeller Report I assume, “Persons appointed to the position of Director of Central Intelligence
should be individuals of stature, independence and integrity. In making this appointment, consideration
should be given to individuals from outside the career service of the CIA although promotion from
within should not be barred.” Now when I read that passage, at the time that the Rockefeller
Commission Report first came out, I took that very personally. In other words I took it subjectively,
because I figured that this was an attack on the various things the report addressed itself to and that they
were being laid at my door since I was the first career person that had been made Director.
I (W-0) I think that if that is what they had in mind (or the staffers who wrote the report had in mind,
I because when one reads that report it is quite clear that neither Nelson Rockefeller nor a lot of members
of that Commission really carefully focused on what they were saying - it was written by those lawyers
that were the staff men - I don’t think that this would have appeared in the form that it did) but
nevertheless, let me make the point that I want to make to you, which is this: if one examines the
1
1
I
i various operations, projects, and events which were so criticized at the time of the 1975 events, it is true
that I was in the Agency all during that period. But certainly I was not the only person who knew about
business was known to Allen Dulles and known to McCone. All these question about assassination
I know of, to blow up Castro with that crazy thing that Des Fitzgerald invented, but leaving all that aside
,I
or authorized some of these things, for example, the “letter opening” thing was started by Allen Dulles.
It was well known to John McCone, even though he denies ever having known about it. The drug
plots, which I throw down as being utterly wet and weedy, there was no intention on anybody’s part, that
I
i
I
I
,
1
!HR70-14
(U)
I
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2008
I
I
i
I
I