Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 2

MUCCIO: Well, I had good grounds to be very skeptical
of Ydiogras. He was a man who preferred to
be mischievous, even when it was not to his
advantage. They were not under CIA or the US.
These were his boys. He talked about them
incessantly every time I saw him. He talked
loosely about this to many others. His lack
of perception and sensitivity was evident in
the baffling attempt to use Cubans to suppress
the revolt of his army on November 13, 1960.
I heard of his plan to inject Cubans into this
purely Guatemalan fray as follows:
Midnight, Saturday, November 13, a third of
the Guatemalan armed forces "took off" against
Ydigoras. At La Aurora Air Force headquarters,
junior officers disarmed and isolated the Chief
of Staff. Shortly thereafter some had mis-
givings, could not agree on the next move and
decided to let the Americans know what was
underway, particularly since they had received
word that Ydigoras had secretly ordered some
DC-3 planes loaded with Cubans flown to Puerto
Barrios where the revolt was most active.
They'd first called in Lieutenant Colonel
(William J.) Cavoli, who was the air attache.
Cavoli didn't know what to do and called
Colonel John Berry, senior Army attache.
Just as soon as Berry arrived there and saw
what was underway he called my deputy (Robert
F.) Bob Corrigan. Bob 'Corrigan said, "this
is something the ambassador should know about
right away." The whole American group carne up
td the embassy residence. The liaison man carne
in a few minutes later and said that the Cuban
trainees were already airlifted and should
have landed by now in Puerto Barrios. I
turned around to the liaison man -- he had
instant access to Ydiogoras at all times --
and I said, "You go tell President Ydigoras that
those Cubans should not be used in Puerto Barrios;
that if they have landed to keep them at the
airport; if they have not landed to return
them back to It What was the name of that
airport?
- 254 -