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Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 14 …an anti-Castro program before Chief JMATE, Jacob D. Esterline, and I Robert K. Davis, met…
  • p. 54 …Batres. !±i/ Jacob D. Esterline, Chief of J~ARC project had some subsequent conversation with the…
  • p. 160 …Memo for Record from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 Jun 60, sub: Negotiations with President Miguel Ydigoras…
  • p. 163 …20 Oct 60. 36. Oral History Interview: Jacob O. Esterline by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11…
  • p. 166 …to the Sec Def, OSO from Jacob D. Esterline, 16 Nov 60, sub: Emergency Evacua~ tion…
  • p. 168 …Memo for Asst~ Sec Def OSO from Jacob D. Esterline, 5 Jan 61, sub: Requirement for…
  • p. 170 …MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 5 Apr 61, sub: Meet- ing with Adolph sic A. Berle…
  • p. 171 …MR from Jacob D. Esterline,S Apr 61, sub: Meeting with Adolph sic A. Berle. 14…
  • p. 173 …Memo for Record from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Meeting withDCI and Assistant Secretary…
  • p. 174 …Memo for DDP/EMB from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 Dec 60, sub: Four JMARC Problems for…
need exists and transfer otherwise
proper.
C. Provide GOG with B-26 aircraft if,
and only if, critical need exists,
use likely give substantial advan-
tage, and GOG can provide pilots.
In connection with any decision support
Ydigoras weigh possibility whether not
remote that rebels may not be left wing nor
anti-US, as active support [for Ydigoras]
under such circumstances could be undesir-
able. 53a/*
Before the afternoon (14 November) was over, a
cable from Headquarters went to all Latin American
stations alerting everyone to the possibility of
Cuban intervention in any of the Latin American coun-
tries. It warned:
As events unfold, keep in mind, we
want picture Castro "intervention" as
result clandestine subversion, money
* As already reported, "ambiguity" was not avoided --
Connie Seigrist has noted that he flew some 15 hours
in the course,of two days, 14-15 November. According
to this message -- which was received at approximately
1400 hours Guatemalan time on 14 November -- Seigrist
technically should have been grounded. As Seigrist
reported, however, he was taking orders from Col.
Batres because no one had told him otherwise. Seigrist
continued to follow the initial orders that he had been
given- to support Col. Batres's requests, and he stopped
flying missions when Guatemal~n officers told him the
revolt had ended.

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.