Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 16 …According to Esterline's report of the meeting "it was never said in so many words…
  • p. 31 …DPD planned to have the SALA representa- tive, who had never been cleared by the Agency…
  • p. 34 …The communications officer whom Alejos had declared to be "under arrest" was never technically arrested and…
  • p. 53 …We never were informed of KIA or wounded counts. We did hear that a couple of…
  • p. 55 …round Guatemala for years and we have never seen Guatemalan pilots fly or shoot with the…
  • p. 64 …emphatically * Delivery of the ~ight B-26's was never made to the Government of Guatemala.
  • p. 75 …Ydigoras said, "that piece of paper will never be exposed," and it hasn't to my…
  • p. 76 …young man I said, "Well, we're never going to get this thing going unless somebody…
  • p. 106 …Venezuela, have made many friendly noises but never once have made a firm offer of real…
  • p. 138 …the project "until Castro's defeat" was never officially made to either President Somoza or President…
  • p. 147 …they were on the ships they would never return to Nicaragua. With reference to the air…
  • p. 153 …68/* * The Agency's relations with Nicaragua also became \ somewhat strained because Miro Cardona was never…
see the Secretary in the morning. So
here again, you have Ydigoras levying a
request on an Agency representative
locally, under circumstances and with a
time schedule that, as it turned out,
made effective reference to the State
Department just impossible. The State
Department was not equipped to decide
something like that within an hour....
r know that r sent a cable to Egan saying
"Yes" on my responsibility; and my reasons
for doing that -~ very definitely at the
time -- were that r didn't think that de-
cision ought to be left to Egan. 41/
There seems to have been some confusion as to
what actually happened following the request which
Mr. Bissell approved. The initial cable reporting
the action stated simply that:
Upon Ydigoras's instr~~tions through
Alejos, aircraft and troops launched on
schedule. However, when planes at Puerto
Barrios, order countermanded as it dis-
covered majority rebels had evacuated base
during night. All aircraft and TRAV
troops returned JMADD. 42/
On 17 November however, in an after action report it
was stated:
MADD B-26's commenced airs trike against
Puerto Barrios air base at 0607 hours local,
strafing area with rockets and .50 cal.
As first C-46 started to land, B-26's strafed
in front landing C-46. C-46 made successful
-landing encountering sporadic small arms
fire. Cuban trainees aboard aircraft re-
turned fire through ports during landing.
Recall order given before C-46 completed
landing. Therefore, pilot did 180 degree
- 39 -
TOPfRET

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.