Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 71 …formalized (16 November 1960), then J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, prepared a memorandum for…
  • p. 76 …C. King, "J. C., this kind of ... " "No, no," he said. "I don't think I…
  • p. 88 …however, was prepared by Colonel J. C. King, Chief, WH Division, not by Thomas A. Parrott…
  • p. 89 …King must have ignored Esterline's warning; but the DCI failed to support King's Plan…
  • p. 117 …of State of the trip and Col. King had informed Thomas Mann. 9/*. In a meeting…
  • p. 120 …to Chief, WH Division (Col. J. C. King) that Robertson be brought into the JMARC program…
  • p. 138 …discuss Project JMATE with President Somoza. Col. King, in speaking of Whelan r~marked as follows…
  • p. 160 …2. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing…
  • p. 163 …35. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub: Observations on Briefing of…
  • p. 167 …TRAV. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 28 Oct 60, sub: Employment of U.S…
  • p. 169 …10 Jan 61. MR from J. C. King, 11 Jan 61, sub: Meeting to Discuss Proposed…
  • p. 173 …Irving G. CADICK (P) from J. C. King, 2 Dec 60, sub: Letter of Instruction. Ibid…
  • p. 175 …IN 1797). 42. Memo from J. C. King for DCI, 19 Jan 61, sub: Visit of…
see the Secretary in the morning. So
here again, you have Ydigoras levying a
request on an Agency representative
locally, under circumstances and with a
time schedule that, as it turned out,
made effective reference to the State
Department just impossible. The State
Department was not equipped to decide
something like that within an hour....
r know that r sent a cable to Egan saying
"Yes" on my responsibility; and my reasons
for doing that -~ very definitely at the
time -- were that r didn't think that de-
cision ought to be left to Egan. 41/
There seems to have been some confusion as to
what actually happened following the request which
Mr. Bissell approved. The initial cable reporting
the action stated simply that:
Upon Ydigoras's instr~~tions through
Alejos, aircraft and troops launched on
schedule. However, when planes at Puerto
Barrios, order countermanded as it dis-
covered majority rebels had evacuated base
during night. All aircraft and TRAV
troops returned JMADD. 42/
On 17 November however, in an after action report it
was stated:
MADD B-26's commenced airs trike against
Puerto Barrios air base at 0607 hours local,
strafing area with rockets and .50 cal.
As first C-46 started to land, B-26's strafed
in front landing C-46. C-46 made successful
-landing encountering sporadic small arms
fire. Cuban trainees aboard aircraft re-
turned fire through ports during landing.
Recall order given before C-46 completed
landing. Therefore, pilot did 180 degree
- 39 -
TOPfRET

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.