Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 21 Alejos's position from the Cubans -- his role would be as a private Guatemalan citizen, cooperating…
  • p. 23 …Cover, Security and Latin Pride A high degree of cooperation between the President of Guatemala and…
  • p. 39 …Agency training programs were developed with the full and complete cooperation of the President of Guatemala…
  • p. 48 …This witness recalled Headquarter's instructions to cooperate with Alejos and also the authorization for Seigrist…
  • p. 84 …was marked by a spirit of close cooperation between the Government of Guatemala and the Agency…
  • p. 85 …it was reported that there was close cooperation be- tween~and Roberto Alejos with regard to…
  • p. 91 …Once again Ydigoras lectured the Cuban political leaders about the need for unity and cooperation with…
  • p. 115 …office with the rest of State, the cooperation of which we need. It is incumbent upon…
  • p. 116 …American country, receiving his full support and cooperation. Somoza volunteered to foot the cost of the…
  • p. 149 …ever, is that Somoza gave his full cooperation to the Agency effort to mount the operation…
  • p. 153 …Somoza himself was characterized as continuing to be quite cooperative with the Agency representatives but fearful…
see the Secretary in the morning. So
here again, you have Ydigoras levying a
request on an Agency representative
locally, under circumstances and with a
time schedule that, as it turned out,
made effective reference to the State
Department just impossible. The State
Department was not equipped to decide
something like that within an hour....
r know that r sent a cable to Egan saying
"Yes" on my responsibility; and my reasons
for doing that -~ very definitely at the
time -- were that r didn't think that de-
cision ought to be left to Egan. 41/
There seems to have been some confusion as to
what actually happened following the request which
Mr. Bissell approved. The initial cable reporting
the action stated simply that:
Upon Ydigoras's instr~~tions through
Alejos, aircraft and troops launched on
schedule. However, when planes at Puerto
Barrios, order countermanded as it dis-
covered majority rebels had evacuated base
during night. All aircraft and TRAV
troops returned JMADD. 42/
On 17 November however, in an after action report it
was stated:
MADD B-26's commenced airs trike against
Puerto Barrios air base at 0607 hours local,
strafing area with rockets and .50 cal.
As first C-46 started to land, B-26's strafed
in front landing C-46. C-46 made successful
-landing encountering sporadic small arms
fire. Cuban trainees aboard aircraft re-
turned fire through ports during landing.
Recall order given before C-46 completed
landing. Therefore, pilot did 180 degree
- 39 -
TOPfRET

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.