Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

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“Headquarters”46 pages

p. 26 …field, but it created negative responses from Headquarters. Sounding in one instance Very much like a…
p. 27 …Upon completion of this briefing, Guatemala cabled Headquarters that Cruz enthusiastically endorses effort and will assist…
p. 28 …an incoming ,aircraft schedule, and Guatemala cabled Headquarters to insist -- again, * CND actually had P2V's…
p. 32 …with reference to the accidental death of the Brigade trainee, a cable from Guatemala to Headquarters…
p. 33 …According to the report to Headquarters, Batres thought that he was being denied access to the…
p. 35 …29/ Following Headquarters authorization of the payments to Alejos and Ralda, went to Headquarters with a…
p. 36 …Alejos had tried to raise the difference between the $100,000 Headquarters had approved and the…
p. 41 …the Guatemalans, no progress was made with Headquarters on the plan. 37/* * In fact, Ydigorasand his…
p. 43 …How desperate the situation appeared to the GOG was noted in a cable from Headquarters to…
p. 44 …cable traffic among Guatemala City, JMADD, and Headquarters that continued for the next three to four…
p. 46 …Requests from the field went to Headquarters for the standby of additional B-26's that…
p. 47 …base as commanding officer, went forward to Headquarters with a GOG request to use JMATE's…
p. 48 …Apparently failing to receive an answer from Headquarters concerning the use of US pilots and Cuban…
p. 49 …40/* The Headquarters reaction to this request is best explained in the words of the then…
p. 58 …Before committing any DPD aircraft Headquarters carefully inquired if any "Guat air assets defected or been…
p. 59 …53/ Even as the joint message was going forward, Headquarters was aware of the fact that…
p. 61 …53a/* Before the afternoon (14 November) was over, a cable from Headquarters went to all Latin…
p. 62 …of the revolt * It was reported to Headquarters that on the mOLning of 15 Nov 60…
p. 63 in Guatemala, Headquarters informed the base in Florida to "discourage" Tony Varona from sending any FRD…
p. 64 …56/ Headquarters requested: ~contact Ydigoras and ask him whe~ continued presence Cuban train- ees is placing…
p. 66 …In his cable to headquarters reporting the incident, Chief of Base TRAV also had indicated that…
p. 75 …67/ The cable went on to request that Headquarters contact Roberto Alejos requesting that he remain…
p. 94 …In any event, Headquarters sent an OPIM cable to Guatemala recommending that Alejos and Ydigoras -83…
p. 98 …in any event, he cabled OPIM to Headquarters re- porting on Ydigoras's feeling. Roberto Alejos…
p. 103 …in a cable from c=J to Headquarters reading: "GOG request andD concurs immediate air- shipment…
p. 104 …89/ Headquarters approved the request for the addi- tional support, but one problem did come up…
p. 105 …Special Forces personnel until further authorization from Headquarters. 90/ How close the ties between the Government…
p. 115 It is the opinion of the writer that guidance must be passed to Holloway by Headquarters…
p. 116 …of 1960, a survey team from Agency Headquarters under the direction of Napoli made a trip…
p. 121 …On Headquarter's approval of the plan for base construction, a Base Manager will be provided…
p. 122 …Robertson was getting ready to depart for Headquarters, that the air element in DPD which had…
p. 130 …He further stated that he did not worry concerning the authority that Headquarters had. 30/ For…
p. 131 …the same apparently did not apply in Headquarters area. On 28 December 1960 the Chief of…
p. 132 …33/ Despite the concern over the official policy for Nicaragua, Headquarters apparently missed or ignored one…
p. 135 …Jan 61 according to one source, a Headquarters 'team arrived at JMTIDE to arrange for and…
p. 136 …utilization of Puerto Cabezas, Robert- son alerted Headquarters that the Nicaraguan situation would soon be complicated…
p. 138 …use of Puerto Cabezas, dragged on at Headquarters, * To the author's knowledge, the suggestion for…
p. 141 …On 1 February 1961, a cable went to Robertson from Headquarters stating "Headquarters has arranged with…
p. 143 …together." 50/* When Robertson departed Nicaragua for Headquarters on 14 February 1961, he received high marks…
p. 145 …54/ At the same time that the Agency was holding Somoza's hand, Headquarters was being…
p. 150 …be destroyed on the ground, they asked Headquarters to approach the US Navy about es- tablishing…
p. 151 …TIDE.* The emergency cable from TIDE to Headquarters recommended that the radar picket be established by…
p. 152 …66a/ As of 25 April 1961, the crewmen were still in custody, and Headquarters instructed TIDE…
p. 153 …Why Headquarters was so reluctant to approve such a meeting is, in hindsight, difficult to understand…
p. 154 …If not, does Headquarters authorize briefing if Ambassador so requests. 70/ 0 This was a strange…
p. 155 …made to President Somoza after receiving prior Headquarters guidance. Further, the Agency failed to meet the…

Ydigoras would like to use the JMTRAV Cubans -- the
majority of whom had volunteered to fight for Guate-
mala -- to help put down the revolt. As the first
day wore on, the situation of the Guatemalan govern-
ment became increasingly difficult. Ydigoras ordered
a 30-day state of siege and called an emergency session
of Congress. The rebel forces were gaining more ground,
literally and figuratively.
Apparently failing to receive an answer from
Headquarters concerning the use of US pilots and Cuban
troops, I I cabled Headquarters shortly be-
fore 0300 hours (Washington time) on 14 November 1960
with a request from Ernie Sparks and Col. Egan for
permission to commit 218 Cuban volunteers from JMTRAV
as airborne infantry for an assault landing at the
Puerto Barrios air base at dawn.. In addition, they
also requested permission to utilize MADD B-26's
\
piloted by US personnel -- volunteers again -- to
Although the cable traffic fails to mention
this incursion by Alejos, it is verified by an eye-
witness who was present in the communications room
at Retalhuleu when Alejos forced himself into the
secure area. This witness recalled Headquarter's
instructions to cooperate with Alejos and also the
authorization for Seigrist and Beale to fly strikes
against the rebels in Puerto Barrios. 39d/
~:LTOP/tCRET

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.