Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 16 …According to Esterline's report of the meeting "it was never said in so many words…
  • p. 31 …DPD planned to have the SALA representa- tive, who had never been cleared by the Agency…
  • p. 34 …The communications officer whom Alejos had declared to be "under arrest" was never technically arrested and…
  • p. 53 …We never were informed of KIA or wounded counts. We did hear that a couple of…
  • p. 55 …round Guatemala for years and we have never seen Guatemalan pilots fly or shoot with the…
  • p. 64 …emphatically * Delivery of the ~ight B-26's was never made to the Government of Guatemala.
  • p. 75 …Ydigoras said, "that piece of paper will never be exposed," and it hasn't to my…
  • p. 76 …young man I said, "Well, we're never going to get this thing going unless somebody…
  • p. 106 …Venezuela, have made many friendly noises but never once have made a firm offer of real…
  • p. 138 …the project "until Castro's defeat" was never officially made to either President Somoza or President…
  • p. 147 …they were on the ships they would never return to Nicaragua. With reference to the air…
  • p. 153 …68/* * The Agency's relations with Nicaragua also became \ somewhat strained because Miro Cardona was never…
that would be used in the overflight. 18/* The pros-
pect of utilizing Guatemalan,personnel in addition
to the Cubans appeared attractive to Agency personnel
in the field, but it created negative responses from
Headquarters.
Sounding in one instance Very much like a reply
originated from the Department of State, the Head-
quarters response to a c==Jrequest that a Guatemalan
cadre be infiltrated with the Cuban teams read: "Neg-
ative Possibility adverse political repercussions
too great to justify this action." 19/ The enthusiasm
in Guatemala also went beyond those immediately in
charge of the government. In October 1960 pending
a Guatemalan congressional investigation of activities
* An odd feature about the cable from 1 __
to Headquarters with Ydigoras's request was the fol-
lowing query: "Do you have Cuban crew selected? Would
they come from air group already in Guatemala?" This
would appear to be the long way around to get an
answer to the question and may reflect the incipient
antipathy between the WH/4 contingent at JMTRAV and
the DPD elements at the air base at Retalhuleu which
would later lead to harsh words and bitter recrimina-
tions that would only be solved -- and then in part --
by th€ DDP, Richard M. Bissell. As nearly as can be
determined, Carl Jenkins was the first COB at JMTRAV,
serving from early September until 9-10 December 1960. 18a/
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.