Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 21 Alejos's position from the Cubans -- his role would be as a private Guatemalan citizen, cooperating…
  • p. 23 …Cover, Security and Latin Pride A high degree of cooperation between the President of Guatemala and…
  • p. 39 …Agency training programs were developed with the full and complete cooperation of the President of Guatemala…
  • p. 48 …This witness recalled Headquarter's instructions to cooperate with Alejos and also the authorization for Seigrist…
  • p. 84 …was marked by a spirit of close cooperation between the Government of Guatemala and the Agency…
  • p. 85 …it was reported that there was close cooperation be- tween~and Roberto Alejos with regard to…
  • p. 91 …Once again Ydigoras lectured the Cuban political leaders about the need for unity and cooperation with…
  • p. 115 …office with the rest of State, the cooperation of which we need. It is incumbent upon…
  • p. 116 …American country, receiving his full support and cooperation. Somoza volunteered to foot the cost of the…
  • p. 149 …ever, is that Somoza gave his full cooperation to the Agency effort to mount the operation…
  • p. 153 …Somoza himself was characterized as continuing to be quite cooperative with the Agency representatives but fearful…
Whelan that Somoza, through Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa,
expressed the opinion that Napoli had not kept him
properly informed regarding the military activities at
the time of the invasion. In the memorandum of his
conversation with Whelan, Napoli pointed out that this
undoubtedly was true because he, himself, had not been
informed immediately of the developing military situa-
tion; and, in fact, it was through Captain Quintana of
the Nicaraguan Guardia Nacional at TIDE that he first
learned that the beach at Playa Giron was being aban-
doned.
Moreover, Napoli pointed out that the Agency had
violated its own commitment to Somoza that none of the
Brigade wounded would be brought back into the TIDE
area -- a commitment that Napoli had made to President
Somoza after receiving prior Headquarters guidance.
Further, the Agency failed to meet the date that it had
agreed to for removing those wounded. In addition
some of the vessels returning to TIDE/from Cuba had
wounded aboard, but through Napoli's efforts, apparently,
they were not off-loaded. Somoza apparently bore no
ill will toward Napoli, for upon the latter's departure,.

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About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.