Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 21 Alejos's position from the Cubans -- his role would be as a private Guatemalan citizen, cooperating…
  • p. 23 …Cover, Security and Latin Pride A high degree of cooperation between the President of Guatemala and…
  • p. 39 …Agency training programs were developed with the full and complete cooperation of the President of Guatemala…
  • p. 48 …This witness recalled Headquarter's instructions to cooperate with Alejos and also the authorization for Seigrist…
  • p. 84 …was marked by a spirit of close cooperation between the Government of Guatemala and the Agency…
  • p. 85 …it was reported that there was close cooperation be- tween~and Roberto Alejos with regard to…
  • p. 91 …Once again Ydigoras lectured the Cuban political leaders about the need for unity and cooperation with…
  • p. 115 …office with the rest of State, the cooperation of which we need. It is incumbent upon…
  • p. 116 …American country, receiving his full support and cooperation. Somoza volunteered to foot the cost of the…
  • p. 149 …ever, is that Somoza gave his full cooperation to the Agency effort to mount the operation…
  • p. 153 …Somoza himself was characterized as continuing to be quite cooperative with the Agency representatives but fearful…
troops was apparently rescinded, for on 22 April a
cable from Managua to Washington indicated that Presi-
dent Somoza had approved delaying the removal of the
Cubans until 24 April. Somoza himself was characterized
as continuing to be quite cooperative with the Agency
representatives but fearful that with the reopening to
commercial air traffic of Puerto Cabezas that the de-
tainees in TIDE would be discovered and consequently
his cover story for TIDE activities would be exposed. ~/
In any event, the Cubans who were being held prisoner
were returned to the United States aboard the Atlantico
which, upon the collapse of the invasion, had returned
to Puerto Cabezas and thence to the US via Key West,
Norfolk, and Baltimore. From the last port, the
prisoners were then sent to Washington, and from Wash-
ington on down to Miami and thence to Cuba. 68/*
* The Agency's relations with Nicaragua also became \
somewhat strained because Miro Cardona was never brought
to Nicaragua to meet with President Somoza, despite
the fact that this had been requested by Somoza on
several occasions. Why Headquarters was so reluctant
to approve such a meeting is, in hindsight, difficult
to understand. Just prior to moving the operation from
Guatemala to Nicaragua, Miro Cardona was completing a
tour of the TRAV/MADD installations. Why he could not
have been taken on to the JMTIDE area at that time is
not made clear in either the cable traffic or other data
that are available. 69/
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TOP1CRET

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.