Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 21 Alejos's position from the Cubans -- his role would be as a private Guatemalan citizen, cooperating…
  • p. 23 …Cover, Security and Latin Pride A high degree of cooperation between the President of Guatemala and…
  • p. 39 …Agency training programs were developed with the full and complete cooperation of the President of Guatemala…
  • p. 48 …This witness recalled Headquarter's instructions to cooperate with Alejos and also the authorization for Seigrist…
  • p. 84 …was marked by a spirit of close cooperation between the Government of Guatemala and the Agency…
  • p. 85 …it was reported that there was close cooperation be- tween~and Roberto Alejos with regard to…
  • p. 91 …Once again Ydigoras lectured the Cuban political leaders about the need for unity and cooperation with…
  • p. 115 …office with the rest of State, the cooperation of which we need. It is incumbent upon…
  • p. 116 …American country, receiving his full support and cooperation. Somoza volunteered to foot the cost of the…
  • p. 149 …ever, is that Somoza gave his full cooperation to the Agency effort to mount the operation…
  • p. 153 …Somoza himself was characterized as continuing to be quite cooperative with the Agency representatives but fearful…
Among the points outlined in his scenario for
the military briefing of Somoza, the following items
are worth mention in view of the situation as it
actually evolved. with reference to the Cuban Brigade
members, it was to be emphasized that once they were
on the ships they would never return to Nicaragua.
With reference to the air strikes, the scena'rio stated":
Air strikes will begin once landings
[are] made and will continue until Castro
knocked out. Fifteen B-26's will be used.
Somoza need not worry about Cuban Air Force
following the B-26's, as the mission of
those planes in [sic] the total destruction
of the Cuban Air Force. The success of
the operation hinges largely on the con-
tinued uninterrupted use of TIDE for
strategic and logistical support for rebels.
Once we start, we must go until Castro
falls. 59/
Despite the fact that Lou Napoli talked rather
glibly about promises and assurances that should be
given to Somoza, Jack Hawkins, Chief, WH/4/PM, in
testifying to the Taylor Committee made the point that
neither the Agency nor the USG ever gave Somoza a high
level promise of support as a condition for use of
Puerto Cabezas. In fact, Hawkins emphasized that up
until the last moment, the use of this base might
have been denied at the whim of Somoza. 60/
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.