Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 16 …According to Esterline's report of the meeting "it was never said in so many words…
  • p. 31 …DPD planned to have the SALA representa- tive, who had never been cleared by the Agency…
  • p. 34 …The communications officer whom Alejos had declared to be "under arrest" was never technically arrested and…
  • p. 53 …We never were informed of KIA or wounded counts. We did hear that a couple of…
  • p. 55 …round Guatemala for years and we have never seen Guatemalan pilots fly or shoot with the…
  • p. 64 …emphatically * Delivery of the ~ight B-26's was never made to the Government of Guatemala.
  • p. 75 …Ydigoras said, "that piece of paper will never be exposed," and it hasn't to my…
  • p. 76 …young man I said, "Well, we're never going to get this thing going unless somebody…
  • p. 106 …Venezuela, have made many friendly noises but never once have made a firm offer of real…
  • p. 138 …the project "until Castro's defeat" was never officially made to either President Somoza or President…
  • p. 147 …they were on the ships they would never return to Nicaragua. With reference to the air…
  • p. 153 …68/* * The Agency's relations with Nicaragua also became \ somewhat strained because Miro Cardona was never…
Obviously, we cannot in good conscience
expend government funds unless we have
reasonable assurance that we can use the
area. Given the absolute essentiality of
JMTIDE to our operation r the need ·for
early resolution is quite apparent. 33/
Despite the concern over the official policy for
Nicaragua, Headquarters apparently missed or ignored
one very important point made by Robertson in mid-
December 1960. It was a point which from project in-
ception until near the collapse of the Brigade was to
plague the JMARC operation. Robertson pointed out
that
the real problem is that though all pre-
liminary activities can be explained away
by cover schemes devised thus far r we
much face fact that once shooting starts,
it is certain that JMTIDE will corne to
light for what it is. 34/
Had this comment been carefully considered at
this time, perhaps the whole question of plausible
deniability could have been laid out on the table or
laid to rest before it became a critical factor -- if
not the critical factor -- in modifying the operational
plan. While Robertson went about his business in
Nicaragua, there was an increasing flurry of activity
in the Headquarters area concerning the anti-Castro
- 121 -
TOP :jcRET

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.