Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

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the OAS, the UN, or with Cuba. Robertson did play down
the likelihood of serious military intervention by
Cuba because of the strength of the Brigade's Air Force,
once it moved into Nicaragua. ~
The care with which Robertson was treading the
line with Somoza is quite similar to the handling of
the situation by Lou Napoli at the time of his visit
to Nicaragua in mid-October of 1960. Napoli also
avoided very carefully indicating that views that he
expressed represented anything other than his own
personal thoughts.*
* However, in a conversation with a member of WH
Division on 9 August 1972, Napoli stated that he had
assured the Somozas that the United States would not
back out once the Cuban operation started and, fur-
ther, that if Castro retaliated either militarily
or in the UN/OAS, Somoza could expect full support
from the us. .
When the interviewer questioned Napoli about the
authority that he had for making such statements, the
response was that he had this from Headquarters. He
further stated that he did not worry concerning the
authority that Headquarters had. 30/
For whatever reason, Robertson's role in the
negotiations with Somoza apparently left a bad after
taste with Napoli, for in this same interview in 1972
he was quite pointed in noting that it was he, rather
than Robertson who had played the principal role in
negotiations with the head of the Nicaraguan state. 31/
(footnote continued on following page)--