Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 16 …According to Esterline's report of the meeting "it was never said in so many words…
  • p. 31 …DPD planned to have the SALA representa- tive, who had never been cleared by the Agency…
  • p. 34 …The communications officer whom Alejos had declared to be "under arrest" was never technically arrested and…
  • p. 53 …We never were informed of KIA or wounded counts. We did hear that a couple of…
  • p. 55 …round Guatemala for years and we have never seen Guatemalan pilots fly or shoot with the…
  • p. 64 …emphatically * Delivery of the ~ight B-26's was never made to the Government of Guatemala.
  • p. 75 …Ydigoras said, "that piece of paper will never be exposed," and it hasn't to my…
  • p. 76 …young man I said, "Well, we're never going to get this thing going unless somebody…
  • p. 106 …Venezuela, have made many friendly noises but never once have made a firm offer of real…
  • p. 138 …the project "until Castro's defeat" was never officially made to either President Somoza or President…
  • p. 147 …they were on the ships they would never return to Nicaragua. With reference to the air…
  • p. 153 …68/* * The Agency's relations with Nicaragua also became \ somewhat strained because Miro Cardona was never…
caused varying reactions within the Department of
State. U. S. Ambassador, Thomas Whelan, was a strong
supporter of the Somoza government; and, consequently,
looked with great favor on the Agencyls attempts to
negotiate directly with Somoza, believing that this
was a proper step, not only from the US point of view
vis-a-vis Cuba, but also in terms of our relations
with the government of Nicaragua. 17/ On the other
hand, Thomas Mann, 18/ the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter American Affairs, preferred to tread
very cautiously with regard to Nicaragua; adhering
to the formalities of diplomatic nicety vis-a-vis that
government. Within the Agency itself, Mr. Bissell's
Assistant Deputy Director of Plans for Action (ADDP/A),
C. Tracy Barnes, was apparently nervous about the
implications of using the Nicaraguan site because
Somoza was such a bad guy; and Barnes at one point\
stated that "in the long run, we would lose an unac-
ceptable amount of face with these (more democratic?]
countries" in Central America if we worked closely
with Somoza. 19/ Barnes, however, did realize the
urgent need for developing a strike base.
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TOP~CRET

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.