Documents / FOIA release

Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation- Volume 2- Part 1

Central Intelligence Agency · 179 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II, Part 1 of the CIA History Staff's Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, a Top Secret history dated October 1979 and approved for release in July 2011. It looks at how the Agency took part in shaping US foreign policy toward Guatemala and Nicaragua during the anti-Castro program. It covers dealings with President Ydigoras Fuentes and Roberto Alejos, training sites such as Retalhuleu, cover stories, and negotiations with the Somoza brothers for an air base and port. It contains no UFO material.

Open the PDF at page 115 Original source ↗

“Headquarters”46 pages

p. 26 …field, but it created negative responses from Headquarters. Sounding in one instance Very much like a…
p. 27 …Upon completion of this briefing, Guatemala cabled Headquarters that Cruz enthusiastically endorses effort and will assist…
p. 28 …an incoming ,aircraft schedule, and Guatemala cabled Headquarters to insist -- again, * CND actually had P2V's…
p. 32 …with reference to the accidental death of the Brigade trainee, a cable from Guatemala to Headquarters…
p. 33 …According to the report to Headquarters, Batres thought that he was being denied access to the…
p. 35 …29/ Following Headquarters authorization of the payments to Alejos and Ralda, went to Headquarters with a…
p. 36 …Alejos had tried to raise the difference between the $100,000 Headquarters had approved and the…
p. 41 …the Guatemalans, no progress was made with Headquarters on the plan. 37/* * In fact, Ydigorasand his…
p. 43 …How desperate the situation appeared to the GOG was noted in a cable from Headquarters to…
p. 44 …cable traffic among Guatemala City, JMADD, and Headquarters that continued for the next three to four…
p. 46 …Requests from the field went to Headquarters for the standby of additional B-26's that…
p. 47 …base as commanding officer, went forward to Headquarters with a GOG request to use JMATE's…
p. 48 …Apparently failing to receive an answer from Headquarters concerning the use of US pilots and Cuban…
p. 49 …40/* The Headquarters reaction to this request is best explained in the words of the then…
p. 58 …Before committing any DPD aircraft Headquarters carefully inquired if any "Guat air assets defected or been…
p. 59 …53/ Even as the joint message was going forward, Headquarters was aware of the fact that…
p. 61 …53a/* Before the afternoon (14 November) was over, a cable from Headquarters went to all Latin…
p. 62 …of the revolt * It was reported to Headquarters that on the mOLning of 15 Nov 60…
p. 63 in Guatemala, Headquarters informed the base in Florida to "discourage" Tony Varona from sending any FRD…
p. 64 …56/ Headquarters requested: ~contact Ydigoras and ask him whe~ continued presence Cuban train- ees is placing…
p. 66 …In his cable to headquarters reporting the incident, Chief of Base TRAV also had indicated that…
p. 75 …67/ The cable went on to request that Headquarters contact Roberto Alejos requesting that he remain…
p. 94 …In any event, Headquarters sent an OPIM cable to Guatemala recommending that Alejos and Ydigoras -83…
p. 98 …in any event, he cabled OPIM to Headquarters re- porting on Ydigoras's feeling. Roberto Alejos…
p. 103 …in a cable from c=J to Headquarters reading: "GOG request andD concurs immediate air- shipment…
p. 104 …89/ Headquarters approved the request for the addi- tional support, but one problem did come up…
p. 105 …Special Forces personnel until further authorization from Headquarters. 90/ How close the ties between the Government…
p. 115 It is the opinion of the writer that guidance must be passed to Holloway by Headquarters…
p. 116 …of 1960, a survey team from Agency Headquarters under the direction of Napoli made a trip…
p. 121 …On Headquarter's approval of the plan for base construction, a Base Manager will be provided…
p. 122 …Robertson was getting ready to depart for Headquarters, that the air element in DPD which had…
p. 130 …He further stated that he did not worry concerning the authority that Headquarters had. 30/ For…
p. 131 …the same apparently did not apply in Headquarters area. On 28 December 1960 the Chief of…
p. 132 …33/ Despite the concern over the official policy for Nicaragua, Headquarters apparently missed or ignored one…
p. 135 …Jan 61 according to one source, a Headquarters 'team arrived at JMTIDE to arrange for and…
p. 136 …utilization of Puerto Cabezas, Robert- son alerted Headquarters that the Nicaraguan situation would soon be complicated…
p. 138 …use of Puerto Cabezas, dragged on at Headquarters, * To the author's knowledge, the suggestion for…
p. 141 …On 1 February 1961, a cable went to Robertson from Headquarters stating "Headquarters has arranged with…
p. 143 …together." 50/* When Robertson departed Nicaragua for Headquarters on 14 February 1961, he received high marks…
p. 145 …54/ At the same time that the Agency was holding Somoza's hand, Headquarters was being…
p. 150 …be destroyed on the ground, they asked Headquarters to approach the US Navy about es- tablishing…
p. 151 …TIDE.* The emergency cable from TIDE to Headquarters recommended that the radar picket be established by…
p. 152 …66a/ As of 25 April 1961, the crewmen were still in custody, and Headquarters instructed TIDE…
p. 153 …Why Headquarters was so reluctant to approve such a meeting is, in hindsight, difficult to understand…
p. 154 …If not, does Headquarters authorize briefing if Ambassador so requests. 70/ 0 This was a strange…
p. 155 …made to President Somoza after receiving prior Headquarters guidance. Further, the Agency failed to meet the…

It is the opinion of the writer that
guidance must be passed to Holloway by
Headquarters in line with Somoza'squery
in order that I Iwill be properly
informed and prepared to answer Somoza's
questioning on this matter. This query
is certain to arise again from time to
time until a satisfactory reply is given
to Somoza. §..I*
Napoli also indicated that:
The Acting Chief of the US Embassy
further said that inasmuch as he had no
instructions or prior notice of the mission,
plus the fact that only the US Ambassador
to Nicaragua was authorized to sit in
talks, he would prefer to remain clear of
* The Department of State representatives in the
foreign areas which were the sites of JMATE operations
frequently got quite goosey, particularly those of less
than ambassadorial ranks. In this instance, for ex-
ample, [ _noted in his transmi ttal:
The aspect of urgency which brought
Napoli to Managua has given the Acting
Chief of the American Embassy the impres-
sion that we might be operating on a non-
coordinated, uncontrolled, free wheeling
basis ... particularl since Na oli was
. IIh as
~o~n~e~m=u=-:;;:c=-·tC:-:o:;:--o=v=-::e=-=r=-:c;::-o;::-m=~e:--::p=-:a;:-s=t----=a:--=d"-m=-l~·n i s~i ve
resistance here and improve the relation-
ship of this office with the rest of State,
the cooperation of which we need. It is
incumbent upon the Agency that the American
_Ambassador be thoroughly briefed while he
is in the United States on the circumstances
of Napoli's visit to insure no future con-
flict of interests and continued main-
tenance of rapport. 21
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 179 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.