Report of Investigation Agency Access to the Ssci Shared Drive on Rdinet

Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.

## UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED

on the SSCI side of the system and had been repeatedly accessed-had an obligation to answer the question of whether there had been a security violation or a potential violation of law that should be referred to the Department of Justice. Nevertheless, he ordered a "pause" in the(b)(3)work being conducted by (b)(3)nd stated that it was necessary to consult with the WH on next steps. Moreover, he expressed his intention to discuss the matter with Committee leadership the next day.

I repeatedly counseled the Director, as well as and D/OCA, that it was unwise to ask the WH for direction as to a possible criminal investigation. If the WH were to order the inquiry stopped, it could constitute an act in furtherance of obstruction of justice. At the least, it could be interpreted that way by Congressional critics and the press. Merely consulting with the WH would place the Director in a bad light, making it appear that he was politicizing a potential criminal matter. I also repeatedly counseled that informing Committee leadership of the potential breach at this stage would result in the potential targets of the investigation—SSCI staff—being informed of the investigation, and would permit them to "get their story straight" prior to being interviewed by Agency security officers or law enforcement, a practice that would not be viewed as appropriate by criminal investigators. I again recommended that the matter be placed under the auspices of the Office of Security and that D/OS determine next steps, be they to continue the review or to refer the matter to the Department of Justice.

Following these events, I received an e-mail on AIN from praising my work, and asking me to come see the Director so he could tell me how much he appreciated my efforts. I attempted to decline, noting that it wasn't necessary, but insisted.

(b)(3)

At 5:30 on January 16, I was asked to come to the Director's office. The Director said he understood I was concerned about events relating to this matter. Referencing the meeting on the evening of January 13, he said he could come off as "brusque" but that he hoped he hadn't offended me. He went on to say this was a difficult matter, but he was the Director and had to make a decision about the proper way to proceed. He said he appreciated my advice, fully supported all my actions in this matter, and urged me to be proactive in coming to him with future concerns—directly if necessary, rather than through staff. I thanked him for his consideration in bringing me in, but noted that any discomfort I had concerning this matter was not related to his demeanor at the January 13 meeting, but rather stemmed from a concern that I had not adequately or with sufficient force conveyed what I perceived as the legal risks inherent in his chosen course of action.

He asked me what he should do going forward and I made three recommendations: Provide D/OS with written instructions to carry out a review of this matter using all available means at her disposal, and to arrive at a recommendation "without fear or favor"; to refrain from further discussions with the WH until such time as the facts were known; and to contact FBI to let them know of the potential breach—noting that the facts are incomplete and that it could turn out to be a matter of little consequence—but to inform the Bureau of the actions that had been taken and to accept help in conducting the forensic work if offered. The Director thanked me and noted that these all seemed to be