Report of Investigation Agency Access to the Ssci Shared Drive on Rdinet

Read from the scan by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word.

## UNCLASSIFIED/DRAFT ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGED

my understanding from my first days with the Agency, when I was provided with briefings on the SSCI review process by Agency officers, including security officers, was that I have an affirmative obligation to take steps—including of the system-to ensure the integrity of that system and to protect classified materials.

Perhaps most importantly, it was my understanding of agreements between the Committee and the Agency that restrictions on Agency access to the SSCI side were intended to preclude the Agency from conducting substantive reviews of the Committee's work product, not from conducting normal administrative and security-related functions. I ensured that this particular administrative action would be extremely narrow, limited to a simple identification of the presence of particular CIA documents, not SSCI materials. I explicitly directed that no content was to be read, altered, moved, or examined in any fashion. I gave explicit directions that the officers were to search only for the SRT documents. They were not to search for or access any other documents, nor read or review the SRT documents, but simply to determine whether they were present on the system. The review was purely in the manner of an audit, with no substantive review of any document or Committee work product.

Later that day, I was informed that our IT officers had determined the Agency's documents were indeed present on the SSCI side of the system. I immediately informed and We discussed next steps, and I informed them that we could take the inquiry into this matter one step further, by asking CIA's which, under the direction of CIC,

(b)(3) (b)(3)

—to regarding whether the documents had been accessed by SSCI staffers. They concurred, and I asked ODA to contact to request the necessary support. Again, I gave specific direction that the effort was to be closely circumscribed, and should involve only the identified documents. No other documents were to be accessed or reviewed and, again, no substantive review of the SRT documents was to occur. That admonition was delivered via e-mail to (b)(3)

On the same day, informed me that he had discussed this issue with the Director, and the Director had instructed that we needed to be "completely sure" that the documents on the SSCI side of the system were actually the SRT documents. I asked my colleague to attempt to verify the nature of the documents, and he quickly reported that he had looked at the first page of a handful of the documents and confirmed that they were the privileged, draft documents in question, the documents SSCI had not been authorized to receive. informed me that he did not read any of the documents, but merely looked at the front page format of a few to see if they possessed the same warning banner, draft designation, format, etc., as the SRT documents. I informed of this confirmation.

Late in the afternoon of Jan.10,2014, I received a report of findings from indicating that five SSCI staff members had accessed the documents, beginning in the fall of 2010 and concluding in the fall of 2012, about the time the "hole" in the RDI Net firewall had been discovered. The staff members had accessed the documents thousands

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(c)