Documents / FOIA release
This is a report of investigation by the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Inspector General, dated 18 July 2014. It covers Agency access to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence staff files on RDINet, the network built for the Senate review of the rendition, detention and interrogation program. The report found that five Agency employees improperly accessed the SSCI Majority shared drive and that three IT staff lacked candor. It also found no factual basis for the CIA crimes report against SSCI staff.
“Cooper”3 pages
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TO: (b)(7)(c) FROM: (b)(3)(b)(6)(b)(7)(c) 1. In reference to our discussion last week, we obviously differ on a few issues, but only a few. I would like to engage in an informal dialogue with your office in an effort to try to resolve these issues. Nothing in our dialogue should be considered the official position of the Agency until such time as you receive it in an official letter from our Director. For now, this is an informal discussion between us. I have chosen to put this in writing so that you have something in front of you to work with, not notes from a discussion that may or may not convey our position accurately. I think we will both agree that time is of the essence and I have no plans to draw this out in a lengthy dialogue. I would like to come up with an agreement or an acknowledgement that we are at an impasse, no later than Friday of this week (12 Jun), preferably sooner, if possible. 2. From our conference call last week, it was obvious that the most important issue appeared to be the following passage from paragraph three of our Director's 4 Jun 2009 letter: "First, given that we will be providing the Committee with full, un-redacted access to millions of our most sensitive operational materials, we will review the notes, draft, and final reports, and other material generated from the Committee's review of the materials - wherever prepared- prior to removing this material from the Reading Room or SSCI secure spaces." 3. From our discussion, the terms of most concern to the SSCI were, "wherever prepared" and "or SSCI secure spaces." For us, the heart of this issue rests with the draft and your final report. That is the primary item that will be created outside of the Reading Room and likely to leave SSCI secure spaces. I noticed in the letter from Senator Feinstein dated 2 Jun 2009, there was no provision for allowing the CIA to review the final SSCI report prior to publication. So I guess our first question is: Does the SSCI plan to allow the CIA to review the SSCI final report before publication? The answer to this question is important to us and goes a long way in helping us address paragraph three of the D/CIA's letter. 4. Our position is this, we are giving the SSCI unprecedented access to our operational material We are aware of all of the previous studies you have cited as a precedent; however, at no time has CIA ever provided the SSCI with the volume of unredacted operational material as we have agreed to do in this case. Exposure of the names of CIA personnel involved in detentions and interrogations carries considerable costs to our officers professionally and personally. It is something we are taking very seriously. Officers who have had their names exposed in the press have had their lives impacted significantly through constant inquiries from the press, threats, phone calls from
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 57 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.