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USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-80

Central Intelligence Agency · 1982-12-08 · 399 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Joint Committee Print, dated December 8, 1982, gathers studies that the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress. It gives estimates of Soviet gross national product for 1950 to 1980, with indexes of industrial production, agricultural production and consumption, and explains the methods and data behind them. The foreword says official Soviet statistics inflate growth and that the CIA measures offer a more accurate picture. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 36 …In the USSR the collective farm, or kolkhoz, is part state and part cooperative. The land…
  • p. 47 …0.66e_ Consumer cooperatives 1.283 i Retained profits of consumer cooperatives 0.821 Tax on…
  • p. 50 …Hill, The Measurement of Real Product, The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1971; R…
  • p. 103 …Net profits of consumer cooperatives were included with retail trade and public dining. Subsidies. This item…
  • p. 118 …and economic admin- istration, administrative organs of cooperative and social organizations,” for which employment and oth…
  • p. 119 …Social organi- zations include the administrative organs of the All- Union Society of Consumer Cooperatives, the…
  • p. 130 …The profits distributed to consumer cooperative members are now considered to be a transfer receipt rather…
  • p. 133 …Profits distributed to consumer cooperative members 0.027 9. Total income 217.206 Sources to this…
  • p. 134 …Profits distributed to consumer cooperative members. See CIA, GNP I970, p. 23. 9. Total income. This…
  • p. 135 …State, cooperative, and commission sales 141.096 (1)Fo0d 84.104 (2) Soft goods 42.734…
  • p. 137 …Charges paid by members of housing 0.075 cooperatives for maintenance lmputed gross rent on urban…
  • p. 138 …Taxes on land and buildings owned by individuals and cooperatives are from Gosb_vudzhet I972, p…
  • p. 139 …Retained profits of consumer cooperatives 0.821 d. Retained profits of other organizations 0.321 2…
  • p. 142 …Profits distributed to consumer 0.027 cooperative members 8.’C;solidate_d total outlays 215.841…
  • p. 147 …Consumer cooperatives 1.283 (1) Retained profits of consumer cooperatives 0.821 (2) Tax on income…
  • p. 160 …532) plus a share of the amortization deductions of consumer cooperatives. Altough consumer cooperatives are primarily…
  • p. 162 …532) and amortization deductions of consumer cooperatives on industrial capital (0.083 billion ru~ bles-—see…
  • p. 164 …retained profits and income taxes of consumer cooperatives and other organizations, respectively. 7. Total pra/its…
  • p. 257 …Other state purchasing orga- nizations are the Central Union of Consumer Cooper- atives, and the Ministries…
  • p. 286 …Review of I978 and Outlook for I97 9, Economics, Statistics, and Cooperatives Service, April 1979, p…
  • p. 330 …exceeded the prices paid in state and cooperative retail outlets by an average of ~59 percent…
  • p. 331 …index of retail prices in state and cooperative outlets. The index which shows almost no change…
  • p. 332 …In coverage, it differs from the CIA index of consumption, mainly by inclusion of cooperative housing…
  • p. 335 …purchases of these items in state and cooperative retail outlets and in collective farm markets, including…
  • p. 339 …The index implicitly covers all goods purchased in state and cooperative retail out- lets, except those…
Approved for Release: 2019/07/19 C05210421
Part ll
Methodology
The estimation of Soviet GNP and its change over
time presents several thorny methodological problems.
This part first summarizes the major issues in formu-
lating an accounting structure and devising a set of
synthetic prices that will be in accord with the
Western theoretical model of national income valua-
tion and growth measurement. A discussion of the
construction of our 1970 base-year accounts using
Soviet official prices and their conversion to our
synthetic prices follows.
Having described the base-year accounts, the discus-
sion then shifts to the methodological problems in-
volved in measuring the growth of Soviet GNP over
time. The central problem is how to measure the real
growth of a diverse collection of goods and services
when the relative prices and quantities are shifting.
Index number theory tells us that there is no single
answer to this question. A summary of the problem is
provided here with additional discussion. of a few
specific problems that are particularly serious in the
Soviet case. Finally, all of the indexes used to measure
the growth of the various components of GNP by
sector of origin and end use and their underlying
methodologies are described.
The Accounting Framework
The accounts used to compute GNP are partially
determined by the institutional structure of the coun-
try involved. This section first describes the account-
ing units that comprise the Soviet economy and then
describes the main financial flows involving these
units. Next a number of definitional problems are
considered and the resulting differences between the
US GNP accounts and those constructed here for the
Soviet Union are discussed.
The Accounting Units
There are four important types of accounting units in
the USSR. The first two are khozraschet enterprises
and so-called budget institutions, both of which are
27
state organizations. The other two are the collective
farm (kolkhoz), which is part state and part coopera-
tive, and the private household.
Khozraschet Enterprises. A khozraschet enterprise is
a state organization that operates on a profit-and loss-
basis. It sells its output, uses the proceeds to purchase
its inputs, and thereby obtains a profit or loss. The
enterprise, however, must regulate production in con-
formity with the highly detailed state economic plan
and is in other ways directly administered by the
government. Although it differs operationally from a
private corporation in the United States, a kh0zras-
chet enterprise, when viewed from a GNP accounting
standpoint, is similar to and treated much like a
private corporation. It is similar in that the financial
relations between a khozraschet enterprise and the
state are conducted on a net rather than a gross basis.
The enterprise is expected to be managed sufficiently
well to obtain enough profits to finance certain activi-
ties, and the amount of government revenues obtained
from the enterprise depends on its performance.”
An enterprise’s profit is disposed of according to
administrative rules. Most profits go to the state
budget, much like an income tax in the United States.
In 1970, for example, 59 percent of the profits of
khozrraschet enterprises were turned over to the bud-
get. The government takes such a large share of the
profits because it is directly involved in the capital
transactions of khozraschet enterprises, contrary to
the situation in a private US corporation. Most capital
investment is paid for by allocations from the state
budget. Retained profits of enterprises are used not
only for capital investment, but also for a variety of
” it should not be forgotten that a khozraschet enterprise is a state
organization. All of its capital stock is state owned and can be taken
away without compensation, just as the profits derived from the
operation of the state-owned assets also can be taken away. The
director of an enterprise is appointed by the state and is charged
with fulfillment in the most economical manner of the production
plan assigned to the enterprise.
Approved for Release: 2019/07/19 C05210421

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 399 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.