USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-80

Approved for Release: 2019/07/19 C05210421
the pile and the actual weight of one cubic meter of
output. Requirements for weighing vegetables are
relaxed at the peak of the harvest, and the quantity of
vegetables is measured according to the number of
units, bunches, or basketsfull brought from the field.
Later, these are converted to kilograms according to
the actual weight of a sample of the produce.”
According to one Soviet source, on vegetable farms
where harvested area is large and hundreds of workers
are involved, it is impossible to carry out even this
measuring of vegetable output. The first accurate
weighing is done only when the vegetables are sold.”
Deliberate falsification of output statistics is another
source of inaccuracy that is very difficult to evaluate.
There is ample evidence from Soviet sources suggest-
ing that in the Khrushchev era ambitious agricultural
campaigns and unrealistic output targets led many
officials to inflate output statistics. Soviet officials
claim that falsification is less now than before the
1961 decree that imposed prison sentences for falsifi-
cation of data.“ Although we tend to believe that
instances of deliberate falsification are probably less
frequent now than in earlier periods, references to
statistical malpractice occur periodically. Farms still
have incentives to understate one year’s production in
order to reduce plan obligations in the following year
or to obtain permission to curtail production of an
unprofitable commodity. In 1978 a resolution of the
Georgian Central Committee cited frequent cases of
padding, underreporting, and other gross “distor-
tions” in overall statistical reporting in the republic.
Over 3,800 statistical checks were conducted by state
statistical organizations; almost one third of the re-
cords inspected were found to have some type of
deliberate misrepresentation.” The First Secretary of
the Tadzhik SSR recently criticized state and party
organs in the republic for insufficient implementation
of the 1961 resolution against fraudulent reporting.
He cited false reporting of statistics on sown area,
production, sales, number of cattle, animal disease
rates, and other statistics.“
" M. Z. Pizengol‘ts, Biakhgalterskiy uchet v seI'skom khozyaystve,
Moscow, 1974, pp. 111-112.
” Uchet i finansy v kolkhozakh i sovkhozakh-, no. 10, 1979, p. 16.
" Fletcher Pope, Collecting Agricultural Statistics in the Soviet
Union, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural
Report No. 112, November 1975, p. 15.
” Zarya vostoka, 4 June 1978, p. 1. Not all of the instances cited
refer to agricultural reporting.
" Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 27 March 1979, p. 2.
Involvement of several ministries in statistics on mar-
keted commodities may offer some constraints to
falsification of those data. Present accounting practice
particularly provides opportunities for false reporting
of commodities which remain on the farm after sales
or are produced solely for farm use, such as animal
feed. In 1979, both the Georgian Central Committee
and the First Secretary of Azerbaydzhan publicly
denounced falsely inflated reports of fodder produc-
tion in their republics.” Milk production can be
inflated by claiming that nonexistent output was fed
to livestock. Farms have been known to purchase
output from individuals or on collective farm markets
and to credit the amount to farm production.”
Error in and falsification of agricultural statistics
probably vary greatly among regions and from year to
year. Because references to the subject are scarce and
the extent to which it occurs cannot be determined,
the impact on output statistics cannot be quantified.
We can only conclude that falsification probably
causes some upward bias in the level of output figures
and that the degree of bias may not be the same for
every year. As a result, the net effect over time, in the
context of a trend value, remains unclear.
C. Lack of Consistency Over Time
Since 1950 a number of Soviet agricultural statistics
series have undergone definitional changes without
corresponding adjustments to published data. Be-
tween 1939 and 1953 Soviet grain crops were meas-
ured in terms of so-called “biological" output per
hectare. These were estimates based on samples of the
crop as the ripe grain stood in the field and did not
take into account losses of grain prior to and during
” Zarya vostoka, l June I979, p. 1 and Bakinskiy rabochiy, 25
July 1979, p. 1.
“ Even procurement statistics have been doctored, although these
have always been considered more reliable than output statistics
(J.W. Willett,’“The Recent Record in Agricultural Production,"
Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, US Congress, Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, Washington, D.C., 1962, pp. 96-98). Instances
of collusion among farm officials, state procurement agents, and
inspection officials have been reported (Zakupki seI’skokhozyayst-
vennykh produktov, no. 2, 1978). Farms, for example, have been
credited with fictitious deliveries of agricultural products to pro-
curement agencies. Zakupki se! Zrkokhozyaystvennykh productov,
no. 10, 1975, reports such fraudulent transactions in the Ukraine,
Lithuania, and Belorussia.
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