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USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-80

Central Intelligence Agency · 1982-12-08 · 399 pages · text from the file's own layer

This Joint Committee Print, dated December 8, 1982, gathers studies that the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence prepared for the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress. It gives estimates of Soviet gross national product for 1950 to 1980, with indexes of industrial production, agricultural production and consumption, and explains the methods and data behind them. The foreword says official Soviet statistics inflate growth and that the CIA measures offer a more accurate picture. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 26 …the shifting of industrial produc- tion toward Siberia, which leads to longer shipping distances to reach…
  • p. 51 …may cost much more to construct in Siberia than in the Ukraine because of greater transportation…
  • p. 268 …European Russia, Ukraine, the “Volga Valley,” Western Siberia and Altay kray, and Northern and Central Kazakhstan…
  • p. 306 …Kok- chetav and Northern Kazakhstan are equated with Omsk in Western Siberia; all other Kazakhstan ob…
Approved for Release: 2019/07/19 C05210421
Western scholars generally agree, however, that inac-
curacy varies widely over time and affects some
statistical series more than others. Political pressure
in the Stalin and Khrushchev eras led to falsification
of output data. The expansion and improvement in the
statistical reporting system that began in the early
1960s may have resulted in more accurate data in
recent years. Even today, however, data for politically
sensitive commodities such as grain are subject to
more manipulation than data for less sensitive pro-
ducts. The prevailing Western opinion still is that
reasonably accurate results are obtained using Soviet
agricultural statistics if necessary adjustments and
cross-checks of the data are made and if the supplied
definitions are carefully read.”
Soviet writers often paint a more dismal picture of the
reliability of their official statistics. Khrushchev stat-
ed that “figures for average yield (of grain) which you
read in the press these days reflect wishful thinking
rather than reality.” 2“ He also said “unless we put
things in order, our plans will be fulfilled statistically,
but we will still be short of food.” 2° More recently a
Soviet emigre characterized the manipulation of Sovi-
et agricultural statistics as follows. “Soviet hens lay a
certain percentage more eggs each year but with one
biological peculiarity. The annual increase in egg
laying begins only with the advent to power of the
durrent rulers.”’°
While we cannot pinpoint the degree of unreliability
in Soviet statistics, we can identify those statistical
series that are most unreliable. The larger the share of
output that originates in the private sector, for exam-
ple, the more error is likely to occur. Private sector
output is estimated by the Central Statistical Admin-
istration from a sample survey of collective farm
families. Data are collected by schedule takers who
visit each family not less than two times a month.
1’ Karl-Eugen Wadekin, “Soviet Agricultural Statistics: Summary
and Assessment,” in Treml and Hardt, p. 282.
“ N. S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament,
(Strobe Talbott, ed.), Little, Brown and Co., Boston, Toronto, 1974,
p. 131.
2° Quoted from the New York Times report on January 15, 1961 (p.
28) of the I961 Party Plenum.
’° Lev Navrozov, “What the CIA Knows About Russia,” Commen-
tary, September, 1978, p. 51.
Efforts are made to choose “representative” families,
but the survey embraces only 1.5 to 2 percent of
collective farm families. The following tabulation
shows the percentage of gross output of major pro-
ducts produced by the private sector in 1979:
59.0
30.0
29.0
33.0
19.0
Grain 1.0 Potatoes
Cotton 0 Meat
Sugarbeets 0 Milk
Sunflower seed 2.0 Eggs
Vegetables 31 .0 Wool
The figures suggest that the livestock sector is more
affected than the crop sector by inaccuracies in
estimates of private sector production. One Western
writer on Soviet statistics concludes that the degree of
error in these statistics is difficult to assess without
more detail on the sample coverage. We can only be
aware that such error exists."
Socialized sector output statistics are derived from the
annual reports of farms. These reports are based on an
elaborate accounting system that is said to incorpo-
rate cross-checks to prevent error and falsification.
Such a system should provide accurate statistics, but
failure to follow prescribed practice and shortages of
qualified statisticians and bookkeepers introduce an
element of error at the initial stage. Moreover, farms
have no incentive to correct for waste because reduc-
tions in gross output entail more difficulty in plan
fulfillment and higher unit costs, whereas succesds
requires high output and low unit cost.
For example, farms frequently fail to weigh their
output accurately. Truck scales are in short supply
and often faulty. Grain output is thus often estimated
according to the fullness of the combine hopper,
although it is supposed to be weighed prior to record-
ing in output accounts. For potatoes and vegetables,
output estimates are haphazard. Potatoes are fre-
quently stored in the fields in pits or piles. The weight
of output is determined according to the dimensions of
“ Eberhard Schinke, “Soviet Agricultural Statistics,” in Treml and
Hardt, p. 244.
262
Approved for Release: 2019/07/19 C05210421

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 399 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.