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Current Intelligence Weekly Summary

Central Intelligence Agency · 1962-03-23 · 42 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is the Central Intelligence Agency's Current Intelligence Weekly Summary of 23 March 1962, a secret digest from the Office of Current Intelligence covering world events. It reviews Soviet foreign policy on Berlin, the Berlin air corridors, disarmament and a nuclear test ban. It also covers Algeria, Argentina's elections, the Congo, Laos, South Vietnam, Guatemala, food rationing in Cuba and Middle East tensions. Special articles assess Brazil under Goulart and Turkey's economic prospects. It contains no UFO material.

  • p. 5 …The Dawalibi cabinet in Syria has made some political gains from what it describes as its…
  • p. 12 …of De Gaulle s personal cabinet told a US Embassy officer on l8 March that if…
  • p. 14 …man military and civil- ian cabinet would continue in office until the new one is chosen…
  • p. 23 …cabinet's handling of land reform, indus- try, and denationalization of banking. Leftist junior army officers…
Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03176167
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Ben Bella are irritated over
Moroccan efforts to capitialize
on the release of Ben Bella.
Meanwhile, De Gaulle is
proceeding with steps to im-
plement the accords. The new
post of French high commissioner
got off to a bad start last week
when De Gaulle's first nominee,
retired general Pierre Billotte
--a long-time "leftist Social-
ist"--refused to accept the
position. Christian Fouchet
was appointed shortly after
the cease-fire took effect
on lfi March, and the French
cabinet has approved--although
not announced--the composition
of the provisional executive.
Fouchet will presumably give
loyal support to De Gaulle's
Algerian policy, even though
he personally opposed the policy
which resulted in relinquishment
of French control over Tunisia
and Morocco. The risk of
assassination by the OAS will
be great for all individuals
accepting responsible positions
during the transitional period.
In France, complete calm
prevailed following announcement
of the cease-fire. Public
opinion from extreme left to
center right welcomed the
agreements. In parliament--
which the government permitted
to debate but not to vote on
the accords--rightists stig-
matized them as "abandonment"
and "capitulation."
De Gaulle, both in his
cease-fire address and in his
subsequent brief message to
parliament, stressed his desire
for massive public approval
of the agreements in a national
referendum scheduled for 8
April. He made it clear it
would be held not only to ap-
prove the accords but also to
authorize him to take all neces-
sary measures, while applying
them, to preserve public order
and the security of the state.
He thus hopes to avoid again
invoking Article 16 of the '
constitution--the much-criti-
cized emergency powers he as-
sumed during the April 1961
mutiny--and thus to counter
charges by the OAS and other
critics that he has usurped
power and should be resisted
as a dictator.
The prompt Soviet extension
of de jure recognition to the PAG
and the declared willingness of
Khrushchev to establish diplomatic
relations mark the end of Moscow's
ambivalent attitude toward the Al-
gerian rebellion. Whereas Commu-
nist China gave the PAG formal dip-
lomatic recognition shortly after
its formation in 1958, Moscow re-
fused to extend even de facto recog-
nition until after France opened
talks with the rebels. However,
even after this recognition in
the autumn of 1960, and Khru-
shchev's remarks shortly there-
after characterizing the rebellion
as a "just" war of national libera-
tion, the PAG up to now had never
received full Soviet support. (bX3)
/s£eRET/
23 Mar 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page7 Of 22
Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03176167

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 42 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.