Documents / FOIA release
This is the Central Intelligence Agency's Current Intelligence Weekly Summary of 23 March 1962, a secret digest from the Office of Current Intelligence covering world events. It reviews Soviet foreign policy on Berlin, the Berlin air corridors, disarmament and a nuclear test ban. It also covers Algeria, Argentina's elections, the Congo, Laos, South Vietnam, Guatemala, food rationing in Cuba and Middle East tensions. Special articles assess Brazil under Goulart and Turkey's economic prospects. It contains no UFO material.
Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03176167 --\ .-_ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Ben Bella are irritated over Moroccan efforts to capitialize on the release of Ben Bella. Meanwhile, De Gaulle is proceeding with steps to im- plement the accords. The new post of French high commissioner got off to a bad start last week when De Gaulle's first nominee, retired general Pierre Billotte --a long-time "leftist Social- ist"--refused to accept the position. Christian Fouchet was appointed shortly after the cease-fire took effect on lfi March, and the French cabinet has approved--although not announced--the composition of the provisional executive. Fouchet will presumably give loyal support to De Gaulle's Algerian policy, even though he personally opposed the policy which resulted in relinquishment of French control over Tunisia and Morocco. The risk of assassination by the OAS will be great for all individuals accepting responsible positions during the transitional period. In France, complete calm prevailed following announcement of the cease-fire. Public opinion from extreme left to center right welcomed the agreements. In parliament-- which the government permitted to debate but not to vote on the accords--rightists stig- matized them as "abandonment" and "capitulation." De Gaulle, both in his cease-fire address and in his subsequent brief message to parliament, stressed his desire for massive public approval of the agreements in a national referendum scheduled for 8 April. He made it clear it would be held not only to ap- prove the accords but also to authorize him to take all neces- sary measures, while applying them, to preserve public order and the security of the state. He thus hopes to avoid again invoking Article 16 of the ' constitution--the much-criti- cized emergency powers he as- sumed during the April 1961 mutiny--and thus to counter charges by the OAS and other critics that he has usurped power and should be resisted as a dictator. The prompt Soviet extension of de jure recognition to the PAG and the declared willingness of Khrushchev to establish diplomatic relations mark the end of Moscow's ambivalent attitude toward the Al- gerian rebellion. Whereas Commu- nist China gave the PAG formal dip- lomatic recognition shortly after its formation in 1958, Moscow re- fused to extend even de facto recog- nition until after France opened talks with the rebels. However, even after this recognition in the autumn of 1960, and Khru- shchev's remarks shortly there- after characterizing the rebellion as a "just" war of national libera- tion, the PAG up to now had never received full Soviet support. (bX3) /s£eRET/ 23 Mar 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page7 Of 22 Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03176167
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 42 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.