Current Intelligence Weekly Summary

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Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03176167
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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In an obvious attempt to
impress the nonbloc powers
represented at the conference
with Soviet flexibility and de-
sire for agreement, the USSR
has formally agreed to the US-
British proposal of last January
that a Big Three subcommittee be
established to discuss the test
ban issue. Soviet delegate Zorin
announced the decision at a 19
March press conference in Geneva.
He made clear, however, that the
subcommittee discussion should
be on the Soviet draft proposals
of 28 November 1961.
In a 15 March private talk
with US and British delegates,
Soviet delegate Tsarapkin firmly
rejected such modifications of
the US test ban proposal as
making the treaty cover all tests
from the beginning, allocating
an agreed limited number of in-
spections in zones where there
is little seismic activity, pro-
viding safeguards against prep-
arations for testing, and short-
ening the time before the begin-
ning of inspections. Tsarapkin
stated that "the idea of inter-
national control is completely
unacceptable" to the USSR, un-
der the situation existing now.
He maintained that "the only
basis for agreement possible is
national control." He reiterat-
ed his views publicly at a press
conference on 16 March.
Moscow has so far not com-
mented on neutralist calls for
a moratorium on atmospheric test-
ing while the conference is seek-
ing the basis for agreement. Nor
has there been any Soviet com-
ment on India's proposal that
the national inspection systems
of the Soviet Union and the West
be supplemented by a test-detec-
tion system to be set up in neu-
tral countries.
Khrushchev denounced the
US decision to resume atmos-
pheric testing in his 16 March
speech, terming it a "severe
blow" to the 17-nation disarma-
ment committee. He again warned
that the USSR would respond to
US nuclear testing in the atmos-
phere by "staging its own tests,"
and contended that Soviet tests
would preclude any possibility
that the US might achieve a
"military advantage."
Khrushchev made it clear
that the USSR will continue to
reject Western proposals for in-
ternational controls over a test
ban agreement and will insist
that national detection systems
provide a "sound foundation" for
an agreement. In the first pub-
lic Soviet reference to the
USSR's 2 February underground
test, he said that this test,
promptly announced by the US
Atomic Energy Commission, was
staged deliberately to disprove
the West's contention that it
is impossible to detect some
underground tests.
Two days earlier in Geneva,
Soviet delegate Usatchev had
discussed the 2 February
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23 Mar 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 4 of 22
Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03176167