Documents / FOIA release
This is the Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence's Current Intelligence Weekly Summary for 9 November 1962, a secret periodical of intelligence appraisals. Much of it covers the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet missile equipment being loaded onto ships in Cuban ports, IL-28 bombers still in Cuba, and Khrushchev's moves to hold together Soviet bloc support. Other sections cover the Sino-Indian border conflict, Laos, Yemen, the Congo, European elections and Ne Win's Burma. It contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”2 pages
I ' | , . Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 Ci031‘59090 Ed Q /sEenET’/ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY terminate their operation in Burma, foreign investors have been discouraged from entering the Burmese market, and the travel of Burmese abroad has been sharply limited. Personal Rule In all areas of govern- mental activity, the greatest obstacle to energetic action is Ne Win's insistence on per- sonally approving all decisions of the slightest import. He distrusts civil servants, and has not accepted civilian politicians to fill administra- tive gaps. The military leaders sur- rounding him in the ruling Union Revolutionary Council find themselves overtaxed with administrative problems. Ne Win's three-month absence in Europe last summer brought a hiatus in policy development, for decisions could not be made without him. Ne Win's deputy, Brigadier Aung Gyi, is moderate and tactful, I i 1. s E i \ 3 0 I I ! and when he led the government during Ne Win's absence there was a relaxation in tension in Rangoon. There are rumors that in order to strengthen the administration, the gov- ernment will recall the vigorous officers, such as Brigadiers Maung Maung and Aung Shwe, who were ousted in an army shake- up last year. . Outlook Prospects are dim that the situation in Burma will soon change. Ne Win gives no indication of preparing to return the country to civilian rule, and the political parties lack the power base necessary to upset his authoritarian regime. It appears probable that Burma will mark time on major economic and social programs,and discontent may cause insurgency and banditry to increase throughout the countrv. \ W flcmsf 9 N 2 PDECTAL A TTPL4 , . < »CV 6 Approvedwfor Release: 5026/0:a;0e 003159090 Page 5 Oi 3 (b)(3
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 34 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.