Documents / FOIA release
This is the Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence's Current Intelligence Weekly Summary for 9 November 1962, a secret periodical of intelligence appraisals. Much of it covers the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet missile equipment being loaded onto ships in Cuban ports, IL-28 bombers still in Cuba, and Khrushchev's moves to hold together Soviet bloc support. Other sections cover the Sino-Indian border conflict, Laos, Yemen, the Congo, European elections and Ne Win's Burma. It contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”2 pages
b)(1 , T , Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090‘ Ev? ha? year? CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY In July the government tried again to attract support by formally establishing its political party—-the Burmese Socialism Program Party. How- ever, the handful of army of- ficers appointed to lead this organization has thus far failed to develop any mass following. Insurgency Undiminished Ne Win appears to have intensified the chronic prob- lem of insurgency and made a solution more difficult. Just before the coup, U Nu appeared on the verge of a political settlement with the ethnic minorities, but Ne Win's in- sistence on centralized control in Rangoon and his use of mili- tary force has further alienated them. Loosely linked through a Nationalities Liberation Al- liance, they have some 10,000 men under arms. Karens, with 6,000, are the most powerful; Shans, Kachins, and lesser groups make up the balance. Although the insurgents do not threaten the Rangoon government, they are a costly nuisance and could become a menace in the future. The government has made no major military efforts against the insurgents but has sought to convey an impression of great success in extensive operations. It recently announced the success- ful conclusion of "Operation Monsoon" against the Shan in- surgents and in a public ceremony accepted the surrender of 150 rebels. > b> \ \ \the Burmese Army has found the Shan insur- gents surprisingly tough adver- saries and has admitted to only7 percent of its own casualties. The situation in the Kachin state is similar. Travel on roads outside Bhamo and Mvitkvina Independence Army in a recent clash virtually annihilated two Burmese Army companies. In dealing with the lesser problem of Communist insurgents, the government has similarly claimed great success. It re- cently announced that the army had smashed the headquarters of Thakin Soe's extremist Red Flag Communists and forced them to join with Thakin Than Tun’s moderate White Flag Communist insurgents. If true, this would be only a minor accomplishment, for Thakin Soe's forces had already been reduced to scattered bands estimated to total only about 500 men. Foreign Policy Ne Win had made no formal change in U Nu’s policy of neutrality and nonalignment and has been careful to main- tain good relations with Com- munist China. He has drawn on the $84 million credit extended by Peiping and at the same time has continued the US Military Equipment Purchase Agreement and sought US agreement to construct the long-delayed Rangoon- Mandalay highway project. After canceling development programs already planned by the USSR, he has opened negotiations for Soviet-sponsored projects of his own choosing. Ne Win's suspicious nature and parochial outlook have nevertheless caused Burma's withdrawal from foreign con- tracts not on an intergovern- mental basis. Private founda- tions have been required to flcmyf 9 Nov 62 SPECIAL ARTICLE page 2 of 3 Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090 (bXis hazardous. \ _ \ 1) \ Kachin (b)(3)
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 34 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.