Documents / FOIA release
This is the Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence's Current Intelligence Weekly Summary for 9 November 1962, a secret periodical of intelligence appraisals. Much of it covers the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet missile equipment being loaded onto ships in Cuban ports, IL-28 bombers still in Cuba, and Khrushchev's moves to hold together Soviet bloc support. Other sections cover the Sino-Indian border conflict, Laos, Yemen, the Congo, European elections and Ne Win's Burma. It contains no UFO material.
“Indian Air Force”1 page
. - A ‘ii PP roved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090 hi? /.sEeRET/ CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY (1 General Ne Win's milita regime in Burma--the "Revolu tionary Government"--has mad almost no progress toward it avowed goal of a unified so- cialist state. In the eight months since he seized power from U Nu and the civilian politicians, Ne Win has fail to develop a program of acti If anything, his goal has be come more distant and less clearly defined. Ethnic in- surgent forces have continue their civil war and have strengthened their popular support. Political Activity Although uncertainty an fear of the overriding power of the army have stifled pub criticism, Burma's various political parties continue t function. Ne Win, with soli backing from his army which made civilian opposition to his regime clearly fruitless expected all Burmese patriot to rally unquestioningly to his revolutionary banner. H even there has been little evidence of popular support for the national military he in his political role. Ne Win aspired to creat a single national party on t lines of the pre-independenc nationalist movement. He ar rested his only rival for na tionalpopularity, U Nu. In order to take the drive out the incipient ethnic minorit separatist movement, he de- tained Shan leaders who want autonomy within a federal st ture. Politicians, whom he despises, should have had no place else to turn--particul since by abolishing the parl ment he had destroyed their sources of public influence. With a naive magnanimity, he ry G S ed on. - d d lie 0 d 2 S OW- I'O e he e of Y ed ruc arl ia- OPECIAL ARTICI NE WIN'S REVOLUTIGNARY BURMA Y £2 encouraged them to continue their functions so long as they did not oppose the revolution, hoping they would eventually rally to his leadership. Support for the govern- ment's socialist goals was easily obtained from the parties. Despite Ne Win's addition of Marxist slogans and his proposal for extensive nationalization of the economy, the revolutionary government's objectives are hardly different from those of all political leaders since independence. Only the leftist National United Front, however, rushed to announce its wholehearted support for the new regime. The Front hoped to gain the confi- dence of the army leadership and then to direct the policies of the government. The undetained leaders of U Nu's Union Party stalled on support, arguing they could not act until they knew the views and condition of the arrested prime minister. The Anti- Fascist People's Freedom League-- the country's best organized political party, with branches in all electoral districts-- also withheld its support, in- sisting upon an ultimate re- turn to an elected government. Ne Win's failure to take immediate action against the parties has given them an opportunity to regroup. They have found supporters among those repelled by the regime's harsh actions--especially the ruthless suppression of student demonstrators at Rangoon Uni- versity on 7 July. Despite several well-publicized de- fections and resignations, the various party organizations re- main a potential force for the government to contend with. Q2616 9 Y 62 SPECIAL ARTTTLIL OV Approved for Release: 202e‘s/021/06 003159090 Page 1 °f 3
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 34 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.