Documents / FOIA release
This is the Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence's Current Intelligence Weekly Summary for 9 November 1962, a secret periodical of intelligence appraisals. Much of it covers the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet missile equipment being loaded onto ships in Cuban ports, IL-28 bombers still in Cuba, and Khrushchev's moves to hold together Soviet bloc support. Other sections cover the Sino-Indian border conflict, Laos, Yemen, the Congo, European elections and Ne Win's Burma. It contains no UFO material.
“Indian Air Force”1 page
, _ Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090 is: ii /saeafi CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY The Pakistani Government is reassessing its foreign policy. Karachi has long been frustrated over what it feels is its allies’ disregard for its basic interest in forcing a stronger India to negotiate over Kashmir. Pakistan fears now, however, that India's new willingness to accept arms from the West and the West's will- ingness to deliver them will deprive Pakistan of the major advantage it has derived from the Western alliance. Although Nehru in 1959 re- fused an offer from Pakistan to conclude a joint defense agreement, the Pakistani leaders have continued to hope that India's growing problems with Communist China would force New Delhi to the conclusion that a settlement with Pakistan was desirable to protect the Indian rear. The Pakistanis now see this prospect vanishing. When Pakistani spokesmen object to Western arms aid to India on the ground that this endangers the "local balance of power," they are really saying that this aid enables India to main- tain military superiority-- better than two to one--along the Pakistani-Indian border and to fight the Chinese at the same time. Pakistan is concerned over the growing Chinese Communist threat to the subcontinent, but it feels that the present Sinc- Indian conflict is confined to a border dispute and does not threaten Pakistan's security in any immediate way. Accord- ingly, President Ayub sees no need for Pakistan to rally to India's defense. He sees rather a chance to exploit India's predicament by pressing for a Kashmir settlement. He is re- luctant to assure India that he will not cause trouble on the Kashmir border or elsewhere because he feels that such an assurance would deprive him- of the only real leverage he has. The Pakistani press has been taking an increasingly anti- American line, hitting at the CENTO and SEATO pacts and calling for improved relations with Peiping. Ayub has held emergency meetings with Foreign Ministry of- ficials and army leaders; he has called an emergency meeting of the National Assembly for 21 No- vember to explain his views. (bX1) Ayub's problems are com- pounded by his need to strengthen his internal political position against a determined effort by old-line politicians to reduce his power under the new constitu- tion. At present his power stems from the backing of the Pakistani Army, which depends heavily on US aid. While Ayub for the immedi- ate future will probably pro- ceed cautiously on foreign policy matters, unless he feels greater pressure is being put on India to come to terms on Kashmir, he is likely to adopt an increas- inskyHn¢00PeratiVeattitude toward the West. particularly the us. \ \ your 9 Nov 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Approved for Release: 2020/03/00 003159090 Page 10 of 24 WX3) WX3
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 34 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.