Current Intelligence Weekly Summary

Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in the hope of forestalling
open Chinese attacks on Khru-
shchev's actions at the height
of the Cuban crisis and of pre-
senting a picture of greater
bloc unity in a time of great
danger. The Soviet press on
25 October endorsed Peiping's
proposals of 23 October for a
mutual withdrawal of Chinese
and Indian forces from exist-
ing lines and for top-level
Sino-Indian talks--terms which
were clearly unacceptable to
the Nehru government. Khru-
shchev reportedly urged Nehru
to accept these proposals in a
letter of 2 November. Moscow
also publicly indicated that
the sale of MIG-21 (Fishbed)
jet fighters to India would
be suspended, at least for the
time being.
When Peiping rebuffed
these Soviet overtures and
derided Khrushchev's stand
on Cuba, and India turned to
the West for military as-
sistance, Moscow cautiously
retreated toward its earlier
position of neutrality. A
5 November Pravda article
and Kosygin's speech on 6 No-
vember omitted any specific
reference to Peiping's pro-
posals and merely urged
negotiations without precon-
ditions.
Future Soviet Policy
Kosygin's speech, together
with Khrushchev's Kremlin re-
ception remarks on 7 November,
suggest that the Soviet leaders
contemplate a period of relative
inaction on the main diplomatic
fronts while they assess the
effects of the Cuban crisis on
the USSR's world position and
study the future course of US
policy. They probably feel the
outcome of the Cuban affair has
reduced Soviet bargaining power
and that there would be no pros-
pect of gaining Western conces-
sions in new negotiations on
such issues as Berlin and Ger-
many in the near future,
Khrushchev implied that he
has abandoned his earlier plan
to come to the US this month to at-
tend the UN General Assembly and to
meet with President Kennedy. He
said such a meeting is not neces-
sary at this time and that he would
favor heads-of-government talks only
"if it is a question of peace and
war." Both Kosygin and Khrushchev
treated the Berlin question cau-
tiously, repeating the standard
formula that they cannot wait in-
definitely for a solution. Khru-
shchev ridiculed Western press
speculation regarding a Soviet
timetable for a separate peace
treaty with East Germany.
The Soviet leaders appear to
be using the nuclear test ban issue
to signal their desire to liqui-
date the Cuban crisis quickly and
to restore "normal" relations with
the West. In reply to a question
at the Kremlin reception, Khru-
shchev said "it is a good time"
for a nuclear test ban agreement
and claimed that the Soviet and US
positions are "very close together."
On the same day, Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov presented to
Ambassador Dean a new proposal for
controls over underground tests.
This proposal was based on sug-
gestions of the recent Pugwash Con-
ference of scientists for employing
automatic, unmanned seismic stations
to police a test ban agreement. Ac-
cording to Kuznetsov, the USSR
would agree to installation of auto-
matic seismic stations along Soviet
borders on the territory of adjacent
countries, if the latter consent.
The Soviet Union would also agree
to two or three such stations on
its own territory, provided the
other nuclear powers would like-
wise agree. While he asserted
that the sealed instruments in-
stalled on Soviet territory should
be transported from and to the
"international center" by Soviet
personnel and aircraft, Kuznetsov
indicated that if the US should in-
sist on foreign personnel partici-
pating, the USSR might accept such
an arrangment. .
ThE;proposal, however, does
9 NOV 62 Apprové6|_i=5F'FEéieaE6fé0§é703/00 003159090 Page 7 Of 24
not change Soviet unwillingness
to accept on-site ins ections on
‘Soviet territory. Fl)W b 3
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