Documents / FOIA release
This is the Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence's Current Intelligence Weekly Summary for 9 November 1962, a secret periodical of intelligence appraisals. Much of it covers the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet missile equipment being loaded onto ships in Cuban ports, IL-28 bombers still in Cuba, and Khrushchev's moves to hold together Soviet bloc support. Other sections cover the Sino-Indian border conflict, Laos, Yemen, the Congo, European elections and Ne Win's Burma. It contains no UFO material.
“King”3 pages
-_,_ J Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090 ' v ad CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY The pronouncements by Kosy- gin, Suslov, Malinovsky, and Voroshilov last week were clear- ly intended to show that the Cuban affair has not affected Khrushchev's leadership of the Soviet party. Voroshilov's 3 November Pravda article, ob- viously written at Khrushchev's behest, praised Khrushchev's "exceptional self-control" in handling the crisis and credited him with preventing a "world catastrophe." He specifically endorsed Khrushchev's letters to President Kennedy as showing that the crisis "can be solved speedily by peaceful means." Voroshilov was careful to em- phasize, however, that "our peacefulness is not a sign of weakness." In his speech at the 7 November Moscow parade, Malinovsky also praised Khrush- chev for his actions to "pre- serve peace" which, he said, were supported by "all progres- sive mankind." The Soviet premier does not seem to anticipate any immediate challenge to his position. Mikoyan's lengthy stay in Havana and the attendance of party secretaries Suslov and Shelepin at the Bulgarian party congress point in this direction. Both Suslov and Mikoyan supported Khrushchev against the antiparty group in June 1957 and apparently have remained allied with him since. Khrushchev would un- doubtedly want both of them at hand if he had any inkling of an impending showdown. Peiping's Reaction Peiping's censure of Khrushchev's handling of the crisis became increasingly pointed last week. The Chinese displayed their dissatisfaction by failing to send a delegation to Moscow's October Revolution anniversary celebration. At the Soviet Embassy ceremony in Peiping, Foreign Minister Chen'Yr made a thinly veiled attack on Khrush- chev by stressing the importance of "resolute struggle" in the crisis and inveighed against any attitude of "disgrace, concession, sacrificing sovereignty, and conniving with aggression." At a meeting of the World Peace Council presidium in Stockholm at the end of October, the Chinese delegate is reliably reported to have characterized Khrushchev's stand as "cowardly." The head of the Chinese delega- tion to the Bulgarian party con- gress reportedly refused to ap- plaud Zhivkov's speech praising Khrushchev's actions. Although Chinese propaganda has not specifically mentioned Moscow as the target, it has been replete with references to "appeasement" of the US and to "Munich schemes" against Cuba. The Chinese have organized daily mass demonstrations protesting "US aggression" and supporting Castro's "five just demands." Among the Asian members of the bloc, only Mongolia has ex- pressed unqualified approval of Khrushchev's decisions in the crisis. North Korea has followed the Chinese pattern of mass meet- ings and has echoed Peiping's propaganda line, The North Viet- namese are taking their customary middle position, combining full support of Castro's demands with approval of Moscow's success in obliging the US "to make the initial concessions." §ino-Indian Conflict Moscow's initial impulse’ after President Kennedy's 22 October speech was to make a con- ciliatory gesture toward Peiping /saenfi 9 NOV G2 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 6 of 24 Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 34 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.