Documents / FOIA release
This is the Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence's Current Intelligence Weekly Summary for 9 November 1962, a secret periodical of intelligence appraisals. Much of it covers the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet missile equipment being loaded onto ships in Cuban ports, IL-28 bombers still in Cuba, and Khrushchev's moves to hold together Soviet bloc support. Other sections cover the Sino-Indian border conflict, Laos, Yemen, the Congo, European elections and Ne Win's Burma. It contains no UFO material.
Z __ Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090 iii 3&7 S T CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Revolution, although Mikoyan and President Dorticos at- tended. Soviet Ambassador Alekseyev's speech was full of effusive praise of Castro as "Cuba's legendary nationa hero." He stressed that Cub Soviet friendship is based 0 "mutual respect" and "comple equality" and again endorsed Castro's five-point demands for US concessions. One area of disagreemen may be the question of the r moval of IL-28 jet bombers. Unlike the missiles which we under exclusive Soviet contr the IL-28s may have been actually transferred to Cuba 1 an n te t e- re ol I1 control under the terms of mil tary assistance agreements. Intrabloc Relations The events of the past suggest that Soviet bloc lea were deeply shaken by the US stand on Cuba and that Khru- shchev is acutely aware that his backdown has made him vu we de ]_-. nerable to renewed attacks by the Chinese Communists and b other opponents in the Commu Y ni movement. In a series of move designed to counter these th to his position and to guard against open disarray in the Soviet camp, Khrushchev con- ferred separately with East European leaders and staged demonstration of support for his actions in the crisis wh included public endorsements by Marshal Malinovsky, Voros lov, Gomulka, and other sate lite leaders. The unprecedented parad Eastern European chiefs to Moscow in a short period of time began with the arrival 1'6’ a ic hi 1- e of j__. ek rs st s ats h of Czechoslovak leader Novotny on 29 October, the day after Khrushchev's backdown. Novotny was followed by Ulbricht of East Germany, Zhivkov of Bul- garia, Poland's Gomulka, and Hungary's Kadar. Khrushchev probably used these consulta- tionsto explain his position in the Cuban crisis, establish a unified line in the post- crisis period, discuss the future course of bloc foreign policy on Germany and other major issues, and deal with separate domestic problems of the East European countries in the aftermath of the crisis Khrushchev apparently in- structed these leaders to reaf- firm the central theme of peace- ful coexistence and negotiated settlement of disputes. Both Zhivkov, in his opening address to the Bulgarian party congress on 5 Novemben and Gomulka, in a Pravda article on the same day1 praisedKhrushchev for hav- ing prevented the US from un- leashing a nuclear war. Both emphasized that "there is no otherroad" but peaceful co- existence. All other Eastern European governments, except the Albanian, immediately adopted this line in their propaganda and official statements The purge of eight prominent Stalinist officials of the Bul- garian party, including Premier Yugov and former Interior Min- ister Tsankov, obviously with Khrushchev's blessing, carried a clear message to the other satel- lite parties that they must give Khrushchev and his policies their unqualified support. Novotny 1S probably under pressure from Khru- shchev to undertake some limited de- Stalinization action in Czechoslo- vakia. Novotny, however, cannot carry any such action far without wrecking his party. }E€Rfi p 9 Nov 62 WEEKLY REVIEW Page 5 of 24 Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 34 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.