Documents / FOIA release
This is the Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence's Current Intelligence Weekly Summary for 9 November 1962, a secret periodical of intelligence appraisals. Much of it covers the Cuban missile crisis: Soviet missile equipment being loaded onto ships in Cuban ports, IL-28 bombers still in Cuba, and Khrushchev's moves to hold together Soviet bloc support. Other sections cover the Sino-Indian border conflict, Laos, Yemen, the Congo, European elections and Ne Win's Burma. It contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”2 pages
, Approved for Release: 2026/03/06 C03159090 is W CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY SINO—SOVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CUBAN CRISIS The USSR moved rapidly last week to withdraw its strategic missiles from Cuba as quickly as possible. Moscow's aim is to undercut US pressure for UN verification of the dismantling and removal of the missiles and to enable Khrushchev to claim that he has fulfilled his com- mitments to President Kennedy. Moscow has taken advantage of Castro's rejection of any form of UN inspection in Cuba and the easing of the crisis atmosphere that followed Khru- shchev's 28 October backdown to maneuver to extricate the USSR from the embarrassing agree- ment to UN verification. Al- though Khrushchev apparently felt that he had no choice at the height of the crisis but to agree to a UN role, Moscow was concerned that this would create a dangerous precedent in the future, particularly with respect to any disarmament or nuclear test ban controls. In order to escape pressure for international supervision, the USSR agreed bilaterally to ar- rangements which allow US naval vessels to contact Soviet ships with missiles aboard for the purpose of counting the missiles When this process of re- moval has been completed, Khru- shchev probably will announce that he has made good on his end of the bargain and call on President Kennedy to respond by issuing a formal declaration guaranteeing Cuba against an invasion by the US and other Western Hemisphere countries. The Soviet leaders probably believe such a move would put them in a strong position to charge the US with "bad faith" if the President should decline to give a formal guarantee on the ground that Khrushchev had reneged on his pledge to accept UN verification. It is possible that Khru- shchev actually hopés to create such an impasse, believing he could use it both to repay US charges of Soviet deception and to recover the initiative in the Cuban affair. At the Kremlin reception on 7 Novem- ber, he remarked that, although the Cubans were skeptical, the Soviet leaders believed that the President would "keep his word." He warned, however, that if a formal US guarantee against an invasion is not forthcoming, this would "put us back to a position of castastrophe." Soviet propaganda has be- gun to accuse the US of attempt- ing to evade its "commitments," in contrast with the USSR which is scrupulously carrying out its pledges. Moscow charges that the US is not only refus- ing to "guarantee and firmly respect Cuba's sovereignty" but advancing new demands that "look like ultimatums." @ikoyan's Mission to Cuba Although neither Moscow nor Havana has commented on the course of Mikoyan's talks with Cuban leaders, there are indications that the Soviet envoy has encountered serious difficulties and has been obliged to prolong his stay. Both Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara were absent from Havana's ceremonies on the anniversary of the Bolshevik /sEenE’1"/ 9 Nov 62 Approved?g?¥eTe‘ase?E0’ér67‘(;E">/06 003159090 Page 4 °f 24
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 34 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.